

EVAM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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TORCHBEARERS OF TRUTH

At this present moment of time and space the human intellect as we know it may possibly not be the highest type of intellect in existence. Higher intelligences may exist in other places or may appear in other epochs. And the intellectual level of these beings may be as much above ours as ours is above the protozoa. Then it may well happen that before the penetrating eye of such intelligences even the most fleeting moment of mortal thought, as well as the most delicate vibration in the ganglia of the human brain, could be followed in each case, and that the creative work of our mortal geniuses could be proved by such an intelligence to be subject to unalterable laws, just as the telescope of the astronomer traces the links of the manifold movement of the spheres.

—MAX PLANCK

This is a remarkable passage coming as it does from the pen of so eminent a scientist. It reminds us of a similar pronouncement of the great Huxley who in one of his essays suggested that there might be beings in the universe whose intelligence is as much beyond ours as ours exceeds that of the black beetle. Theoretically this view is generally accepted. But such Supermen do not mingle among men and so their existence is doubted. In the East and especially in India such Beings of Light, Mahatmas and Rishis, are believed in; but it is also held that in this Kali Yuga,

Dark Age, they cannot be found, cannot be known.

H. P. Blavatsky startled the western world by asserting that she herself knew such Superior Men who possessed superhuman knowledge and who controlled forces of nature unknown to science. There she was ridiculed and derided for this. In India her statement was accepted, but exaggerated notions prevailed as to their powers and the possibilities of their interference in ordinary affairs of life.

In our pages Mr. Geoffrey West has been writing about some

mind, and of present western psychology? Again, the relation between mind and matter, which Mr. Joad calls "that most puzzling of all relations," is not an insoluble mystery to the student of the psychology of the ancient East.

For the reasons indicated above, we are left cold by the announcement that a new International Institute for Psychical Research has been formed to investigate psychic phenomena on strictly scientific lines. The known materialistic bias of its President, Prof. G. Elliot Smith, does not encourage hope that the new Institute will fare much better than the older Society whose failure is now generally admitted. There probably will be the same stubborn refusal of the clues offered in the authentic texts of ancient Eastern psychology, which Madame H. P. Blavatsky synthesized and made readily available. Such theories alone can guide the Western psychologists to the proofs they seek, without grave risk of injury to helpless mediums, the tools on which they depend for their investigations. It is not in the séance room that the great Sages of the East have acquired the mastery of occult arts and sciences and probed the deepest mysteries of nature.

Sir Ernest Wallis Budge, perhaps the greatest living authority on Old Egypt and Chaldea, and formerly keeper of the mummies in the British Museum, has stated in an interview (*Daily Express*, January 17th) that he believes he holds the secrets of the "Death

Ray," of self-levitation, of television, of wireless without the aid of machinery, and of communion with the dead. He is reported to have said:—

All powers were in the safe keeping of the "masters" who passed them on to those initiates who had a vocation for their development and the necessary judgment for their proper use.

When Madame Blavatsky wrote about certain secrets in the possession of Eastern Sages which could not be made public, she was scoffed at as a charlatan. We wonder what will be said now of the statement of such an eminent authority as Sir Ernest Wallis Budge, who, when requested to enumerate the psychic powers of which he knew said, "No; because then I would be locked up." Again, he spoke of knowing "an African and an Indian who could vanish into air as you spoke to them, touched them," and said, "I doubt whether any Englishman could dissolve from view even if he were told how to. These arts need practice." Whatever the basis for his claims to knowledge of the Occult and its present custodians, his interview should provide the new Psychical Research Institute with ample matter for inquiry. Will it be free from the weaknesses from which the older Society for Psychical Research has suffered and suffers? Through ignorance, obstinacy and arrogance the Society for Psychical Research of 1884 lost the splendid opportunity to learn, which H. P. Blavatsky and her Masters offered. From then to now what has it learnt? Nothing.

European Occultists who, like Madame Blavatsky were possessors of extraordinary knowledge and of extraordinary faculties. Having examined the life activities of Paracelsus, St. Germain, Cagliostro, St. Martin and Mesmer, in the following article he writes about H. P. Blavatsky, the anniversary of whose death her students and admirers will be celebrating on the 8th of May.

The policy of this journal has ever been to insist on the examination of the *teachings* of Madame Blavatsky. In them, if nowhere else, can be found the proof that such Elder Brothers exist; for she claimed that such Living Men were her Teachers—the inspiration of all her work, the source of all her knowledge. But if Madame Blavatsky's own word is doubted, then it inevitably follows that she in her own person will have to be given the credit of having "invented" all that she wrote, and what she wrote is one of the grandest and most beneficent philosophies once it is properly understood. No sincere student of her works can help admitting the vastness of her intellect and marvelling at the enormous range of her vision.

For our part we are content to take her word as to the source of her teachings; from the very beginning she claimed "a somewhat intimate acquaintance with Eastern adepts" and she offered very convincing arguments in logic and in fact about their existence and the knowledge they possess.

Is it of no importance to the world to learn that such Wise Men

live? Would it be altogether useless to ascertain the conditions under which their priceless knowledge is available? Is it not possible for some men to fulfil those conditions and study so that they may teach?

There are numerous methods by which those interested have set out to find these Wise Men: there are those who seek them personally, trying to trace them to their high retreats by physical travel or superphysical claptrap. Mme. Blavatsky and others, however few, who have known them and their Occult World have spoken of the one and only sure way, the study of their philosophy which reveals who these Living Men are, what their place in human evolution is, why they continue to labour for the race, and how they work. Their teachings open the gate of gold through which the learner passes to the Teachers for more intimate study so that he may serve his fellow men more worthily and by a method which has so stood the test of time that it may be called infallible. The aim of this Journal is to help its readers to find the Aryan Path, treading which they will find for themselves these Superior Men whom Mme. Blavatsky described as the Sages of the Orient. One of these Living Men has said:—"If you want to know us, study our philosophy; if you want to serve us serve our humanity." Another of Them has promised: "Every step made by one in our direction will force us to make one toward him."

THE OCCULTIST OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I—H. P. BLAVATSKY

[Geoffrey West completes this month his studies of European Occultists. In our February and March issues he dealt with the life of Paracelsus, and in April he wrote of those four heroic characters who formed a Cross of Occult Light in the eighteenth century sky—Saint-Germain, Cagliostro, Saint-Martin and Mesmer. And now he writes of the latest link in the ever-lengthening chain of the Torchbearers of Truth to a darkened humanity—H. P. Blavatsky.—Eds.]

To attempt a biography, or even a portrait, of H. P. Blavatsky in a few hundred, or thousand, words would be not only absurd but something of an impertinence, in these present pages at least. Many books and countless articles have been written about her, and the end is not yet. For those able to hear, a certain knowledge may be presumed—and who shall speak to the deaf?

What should be stressed here are certain similarities in her career and accomplishments and those of some of her forerunners already portrayed. Her remarkable psychic gifts, her mysterious wanderings, the seeming dubiety of some of her actions in the eyes of the world, the charges brought against her, her steadiness of aim, her dominating personality, and yet, with all the general air of doubt colouring the wider view of her, the persistence of respect, and a respect that grows—all these things might be paralleled over and over in the biographies of Paracelsus and even of Saint-Germain. Her life was as strange as any, even in its best-certified events, right from her premature birth and unfortunate baptism in South Russia in 1831—by way of her self-willed childhood, her

early reputation for supernatural powers, her somnambulism, her mannish airs, her passionate tempers, her brief marriage at seventeen to the man she never lived with but whose name she made famous, her twenty-five years of wandering over Europe, America and Asia, her recorded meetings with beings (not supernatural but supernormal) into whose hands she gave the direction of her life, her dramatic episode as a soldier under Garibaldi, her abortive attempt at Cairo in 1871 to found a society for the enlightened study of spiritualism, her new visit to America in 1873 and the spiritualistic controversies which followed, her foundation of the Theosophical Society in 1875 and subsequent work for it in India and Europe, her displays of "phenomena" and the attacks and "exposures" entailed thereby, her persistence in the face of all attempts to destroy the work by discrediting the woman, her miraculous recoveries from seemingly fatal illness during the writing of *The Secret Doctrine*—and so right to her rather sudden death in 1891.

With some at least of these forerunners she was one in her ruthless breaking of all personal domestic ties to serve her real end, in the

tireless nature of her odyssey, in her turning of her great gifts to others' good above her own—and also, in a degree, in what some students cannot conceive but as the misuse, sometimes, with whatever good intentions, of those gifts. She may have ranked as high as any—or even higher—but few approaching her for the first time, or perhaps on further study, can easily regard her as in all things the perfect embodiment of all she stood for. Her character was compounded of contradiction. In some directions profoundly perceptive, in others she seemed almost wilfully blind. She could be charming, tempestuous, childish, child-like, impish, abusive, generous, impatient, penetrative, illogical, wilful, impersonal, egotistic, scornful, laughing, reverent—and hardly so much by turns as all at once. She totally lacked ordinary discretion! Faced by either superior scepticism or open-mouthed gullibility she would "pull the legs" of her audience mercilessly, quite careless of the charges of fraud she might sometimes thereby invite. She defied convention, and laughed at if she did not ignore the gossip she provoked. Thus she laid herself open at times to the gravest suspicions, and yet, with them all, *one turns from a study of her life with the final impression of a fundamentally honest, a deeply serious and sincere personality, possessed of, at once, courage, will, and purpose.*

Always the will and courage held the purpose foremost. That it was not her own purpose, that she regarded herself rather as an instru-

ment, a vehicle, serving others, is evident from the attitude constantly expressed in her letters of having a work to do which she accepted yet could find irksome:—

I feel I am dying . . . I am sure I will drop some day on my writing and be a corpse before the T. S. says *boo*. Well, I don't care. And why the deuce should I? Nothing left for me here.

That with all her gifts she was less than a perfect instrument the references in the published *Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* would alone suffice to make clear. "She has once more proved inaccurate and led you into error . . . she forgets and mixes up things more than usual." On several occasions her competency in explanation of fine points was called into question; she was said to lack concentration, to be "unable to write with anything like system and calmness, or to remember that the general public needs all the lucid explanations that to her may seem superfluous," to be by nature "too passionately affectionate" for "a true adept," to possess a but partial if increasing knowledge, to write at times in a manner "foolish, childish, and silly," and to be (and progressively) indiscreet in her excess of zeal. She was, in fact, "far from perfect in some respects, quite the opposite," and yet with all her "strong personal defects" she had also "most exceptional and wonderful endowments," so that "just as she was, there was no second to her living fit for this work". Despite, indeed, her "habitual incoherence" and "strange ways," the truth was that "after nearly a cen-

tury of fruitless search, our chiefs had to avail themselves of the only opportunity to send out a *European body* upon European soil to serve as a connecting link between that country and our own." She wasted valuable psychic force upon trivialities, and herself admitted the "crime" of revealing in her enthusiasm unpermitted occult secrets, but with it all she was "the only opportunity," and whatever her sometimes jocular comments on the Masters she did in her heart deeply venerate them and serve them loyally.

Did she fail? Clearly not, for her work still stands, but it is permissible to hold that she faltered. Her troubles, her sufferings, declared the Master M. in 1882, were "effect from causes which *cannot* be *undone*—occultism in theosophy." And here at last we are coming very close home to the heart of the problem of the general Western attitude towards Theosophy. Her work was not confined to the West. If her Eastern Wisdom was especially needed by the West, the East needed it only less, and her work in India from 1879 to 1885, with many of her direct statements, make clear that her aim was not alone to bring about an understanding of East by West, but *vice versa* also, so that one body, one humanity with common hopes and ideals might thereby arise. But in so far as she did address herself to a Western audience, she could not wholly escape the fate of such as Cagliostro and Saint-Germain, both, even more than she, given to purely "magical" performances, and both,

in consequence, rather notorious than respected in the Western world at large. That the Masters themselves knew that this would be, at least for her, the probable if not inevitable effect is quite clear from their printed letters. The "most astounding phenomena," K. H. told Sinnett in his first communication, would never convince a sceptical world.

The ignorant—unable to grapple with the invisible operators—might someday vent their rage on the visible agents at work; the higher and educated classes would go on disbelieving as ever . . . The world's prejudices have to be conquered step by step, not at a rush.

Eighteen months later Sinnett was warned by M. against that universal failing of occult students, "the hankering after phenomena," M. adding: "If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy . . . If our philosophy is wrong a *wonder* will not set it right." Madame Blavatsky had of course her reasons, that "wonders" would excite curiosity and so "enquiry into the nature and the laws of those forces, unknown to science, but perfectly known to occultism". But events proved her wrong, and she had ultimately to accept the order "to abandon phenomena and let the ideas of Theosophy stand on their own intrinsic merits". Yet even so, the ill that resulted for her and for those associated with her, appears not only in the common attitude of incredulity but in all too much of the subsequent history of the Theosophical Society, whose "hankering after pheno-

mena" has been at all times all too plain.

Most seriously in Madame Blavatsky's case, these often trivial, essentially inconsequent phenomena obscured the value of her real work, her writings, wherein, in how much greater degree, "the ideas of Theosophy" do "stand on their own intrinsic merits," and to turn to which from the phenomena is, as Mr. G. B. Butt has said, "equivalent to a transition from the sensational to the sublime". There is neither space in the present article nor competence in the present writer adequately to assess her books as a whole. One can only declare the degree of imaginative and spiritual insight apparent in all her works, and how in reading *Isis Unveiled* and still more—much more—*The Secret Doctrine* one is constantly aware of contact with a mind of great power and knowledge, and with marked if variable analytic and synthetic gifts. One may feel at times that here is perhaps the work of one who, as Mr. Middleton Murry has said in these pages, "had not yet truly made up her mind," achieved a final clarification either within or without, but these are *not*, and only blindness can mistake them for, a charlatan's handiwork!

(One persistent charge perhaps needs to be briefly dealt with—that, never stilled, of plagiarism. Quite recently we have had Mr. Bechofer Roberts's statement that *Isis Unveiled* "clearly derives" from *Isis Revelata*, a work published in 1837. In fact Mr. Roberts has been misled by a title; the earlier work covers but a very

minute portion of the ground of the later, and none of its most fundamental theses. To this day the charges of W. E. Coleman in his appendix to Solovyeff's *A Modern Priestess of Isis* remain the only ones bearing even the appearance of substantiality. Coleman achieved the maximum air with the minimum actuality of precision; his enumeration of "plagiarised passages" means little without either his definition of what constitutes plagiarism, or a guarantee of his good faith. It is more than interesting, it is important, to note that he himself had had this identical charge of plagiarism brought against him a dozen years before his attack upon Madame Blavatsky, and apparently on good grounds. Does not a guilty conscience tend too easily to see its fault in others? Actually when one takes a fairly definite charge at random—as that that "nearly the whole" of pp. 599-603 of Vol. II of *The Secret Doctrine* "was copied from Oliver's *Pythagorean Triangle*, while only a few lines were credited to that work"—a parallel examination soon makes all but nonsense of the suggestion. Incidentally, it is clear that to maintain the view of Madame Blavatsky as a systematic plagiarist is necessarily to make liars of all who testified as to the way in which her books were written!)

William Kingsland has said of Madame Blavatsky that she "must be judged by her literary record and not by her personality". And rightly so! But it is interesting in this connection to consider her own attitude to her principal books. It was in general one of a real personal humility combined with a vast—to the sceptic, a fantastic—claim for her writings. Perhaps one should hardly term them even that, for she openly declared them to be not of her own conception, but set down clairvoyantly, recorded, she being copyist rather than

author. She freely recognised the faults of her transcription—notably in the case of *Isis Unveiled*, which she said "contained useless repetitions, most irritating digressions, and . . . many apparent contradictions," besides being extremely confused in its arrangement. Nevertheless "I maintain that *Isis Unveiled* contains a mass of original and hitherto never divulged information on occult subjects." She added:—

Prepared to take upon myself . . . the sins of all the external, purely literary defects of the work, I defend the ideas and teachings in it, with no fear of being charged with conceit, since *neither ideas nor teachings are mine*.

The Secret Doctrine was clearly a work of identical nature, in both conception and writing. Originally it was intended of course as not much more than a rewriting of the earlier book, at least in her mind, but it proved as all know to be very much more than that. It is, beyond all question, the greatest work from her pen . . . whatever its source.

Now the problem arises: Supposing one does accept the higher, or anyway less definable, origin for such a book as *The Secret Doctrine*, then *in what sense* is it to be understood? The question is neither easy nor unimportant. The book is large in scope and various in detail. Exposition of the spiritual nature of the total universe jostles exact and elaborate human history; religious insight and scientific controversy appear side by side; cosmology, philosophy, archaeology, anthropology, physics, myth-

ology, symbolism—all these and as many more departments of knowledge have their ordered places. In the field of science the book was at its appearance seen as running counter to many basic and long-established dogmas. To-day, in 1933, it may still appear to do so. But those who would see what Jericho walls have already fallen should read such an essay as *The Secret Doctrine and Modern Science*, by B. A. Tomes, where it is shown as having forestalled, or according with, not a few of the declarations of Einstein, Eddington, Lloyd-Morgan and others. In the field of history, however, or what is better called pre-history, it offers the most definite possible accounts of declared events which the average Western reader must find wholly fantastic. Must we accept them, literally, as part of the essence of Theosophy?

Some Theosophists, perhaps, will say yes. Others, we think wiser, will say: Only to the point of one's ability, one's true inner acquiescence. One thing is certain—that Madame Blavatsky made no such demand. *The Secret Doctrine* was no last word; it was, in her own phrase in its own pages, "but the pioneer of many more such books". It states truth perhaps but certainly not the whole or the *pure* truth. For one thing, "since . . . this work withholds far more than it gives out, the student is invited to use his own intuitions". As Kingsland has said:—

All these "theosophical" classifications—"principles," "globes," "chains," "rounds" and "rings," etc.,—necessarily

belong to the perceptions of the lower rational mind, which cannot transcend the categories of time and space.

He adds: "There is a very great deal in *The Secret Doctrine* which must not be taken too literally." Perhaps it is overmuch to say of her account of the planetary "rounds and rings"—as she of Sinnett's—that it is "only at best allegorical," but at least it is clear that it can only be understood in the degree of our more than literal understanding. There is a plane of thought upon which all statement, even the most plainly scientific, must be realised as metaphorical (a plane upon which the literal, simply, does not exist), and it is here, on this plane, that such a work of cosmic exposition as *The Secret Doctrine* must be approached—regarded, that is, intuitively rather than intellectually. All perception, save the purely intuitive, and all formulation must involve distortion in some degree—from that only the Absolute is exempt. In one of the *Mahatma Letters to Sinnet*, we find K. H. himself acknowledging: "I must have sorely failed to convey the right meaning, and have to confess my inability to describe the—*indescribable*." That is the rock upon which every religion is sunk if it beware not—the taking of the symbol for the truth, the description for the indescribable, that essence which intuition alone can seize. One authority may be better than another, but *none* is absolute save that which speaks in a man's own heart. We are forced to say of Theosophy's as of every

religion's cosmology, that whatever its claim to be the truest it is still at best less than the True!

That is, I would hold, an at once genuinely Theosophical and essentially Western attitude. And one, moreover, which bridges, or helps to bridge, the gulf already noted earlier in this series of articles between the average Westerner and the teachers of Theosophy in the West. It is not *merely* that they—the latter—are strange. Let us admit that we have to enlarge the scope of Western knowledge, transcend its preconceptions, accept not only the possibility but the *fact* of many things we do at present all too readily deny. Presume all this achieved, and still (one feels to-day) some gulf would remain. For the path of the West is a path not merely of blindness, but of a real, if one-sided, development. It is a path of open individual self-realisation, of interior discovery rather than exterior instruction (though the two, of course, can never be wholly separated); one essentially out of sympathy, as Mr. Murry has put it, "with Madame Blavatsky's tendency to make a mundane mystery of things that are mysterious only because they are spiritual".

Such comment may be far from fair to Madame Blavatsky and her fellows, and one can appreciate reasons for secrecy where knowledge gives power for both good and evil, but the fact of the feeling remains and is a potent force to be reckoned with. Perhaps, one thinks, the presentation of these figures has been wrong—they

have never been drawn full-length for a Western public in Western terms by a biographer at once of the West and yet possessing the necessary wider perceptions and knowledge. The task would require both profound understanding and great literary skill, and these requirements have never been wholly fulfilled, even in perhaps the best of all, Mr. A. E. Waite's study of Saint-Martin, who is clearly the most acceptable of all, turning his gaze inward rather than outward, feeling occultism and alchemy to touch only "the bark of things," finding his wisdom not in the lodge but in the heart, not in the world but in the soul, accepting the traditional knowledge but discovering it valid only as he verified it in his own being, seeking primarily to live *this* life fittingly in *this* world. We cannot but feel that Saint-Martin—and next to him Paracelsus or Mesmer, who achieved their "wonders" as physicians in the service of the sick—is the type of the Western Theosophical mystic and teacher, and that whatever reason may be found for occult practice, wonder-working, these beings would have come more easily home to our bosoms lacking its display; would have seemed the spiritually purer and more satisfying. It is not that we doubt its actuality, but only, as revealed, its spiritual significance; too often it but seems that triviality has been imposed upon greatness, and greatness trivialised thereby. Cagliostro, it has been suggested, was lured by vanity to

use his powers for sheer display, and thereby were those offended who sought in him the pure spirit of understanding. We may hardly lay the charge in the same degree to Saint-Germain, or to H. P. Blavatsky, but the tendency appears, and always to Western eyes regrettably. The Mahatma letters become the more, not the less, impressive when we can forget the phenomenal methods of their delivery, and concentrate attention upon their contents. *Teaching not phenomena, understanding not worship—these are the essence and the requirement of Theosophy.*

These five men, this one woman, they went their various ways, achieved their various wonders, but their knowledge was one; and while the wonders pass the knowledge remains, a true and sublime knowledge when truly understood in that ultimate realisation that Truth itself must always be beyond definition, that every defining statement must be in its nature a metaphorical rather than a "precise" account, that every religion is but one partial and angular embodiment of Truth, and that Theosophy itself, with all its deeper insight, is finally no more exempt from this, no more *absolutely* exact, than the various religions it so profoundly illuminates. The wonders pass, the knowledge remains. . . . "If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy. . . . If our philosophy is wrong a wonder will not set it right."

GEOFFREY WEST

II—H. P. B.

[Reviewing in *The Sunday Referee* of January 7th the second volume of *The Complete Works of H. P. Blavatsky*, whom he described as "an overwhelming and essentially noble personality," **Victor B. Neuburg** wrote:—

This appreciation may seem exaggerated, emanating from one who is not and has never been connected with the T. S.; but it is now due to suggest that possibly, when the true history of the period she covered comes to be recorded, with all its effects and ramifications, H. P. B. may be hailed as the greatest figure of her age.

In response to a request for a more detailed consideration of his judgment, Mr. Neuburg has sent us the following article.—Eds.]

The publication of H. P. B.'s *Opera Omnia* erects a monument to her achievements more enduring than brass; for it is a monument of pure gold; as it is likely that the Sun will outlast her daughter-planets.

Every great life—a life that is "outstanding"—has the quality of uniqueness; the higher we arise in the evolutionary scale, the more our individuality shows itself; for the more "individual," or undividable, do we become. Through intense differentiation we arise towards unity.

The many resemble each other, more or less, in their personalities; the few individualities are alike only in their uniqueness; in their characteristics, their lives, they differ infinitely.

It is these differences, these infinite mutabilities of personality, that cause what we call genius, which is simply an aspect of race-embodiment in an individual. There is a fierce controversy always and inevitably about the merits or demerits, qualifications or lacks, of the Great Ones; for they "strike" all those whom they contact at a different angle of personality; again, a characteristic of greatness.

By this test, H. P. B. may be considered profitably by the impartial student and historian. Everything possible to be said about anyone has been said about her. There is no need here to give the names, even, of her detractors and panegyrists; they run into scores; no two are alike. From the unveiled hostility of J. N. Maskelyne and G. W. Foote to the appreciation of G. R. S. Mead and the Countess Wachtmeister, H. P. B. has been criticised in every conceivable way.

It is only great souls who cause this infinite variety of reactions. There is a crystallization of race-experiences that brings the gift of seeming, and of being, all things to all men. Here is the mark of Attainment; the price to be paid is nearly always, humanly speaking, that of Attainer. Attainer and Attainment together sum up the relationship between the Adept and his fellowmen; this is provable from all our records. And by this standard H. P. B. being adjudged, she is proven indubitably of the Blood Royal of the Masters.

The ordinary human of to-day possesses more facts, probably, than were ever available before in the planet's history. Wisdom remains as rare as ever. The street-

man is "better informed" than Pythagoras or Archimedes; that is, he is better supplied with facts. But mere facts are to wisdom as pigments to the creative artist. In mere facts there is no science; it is in the weaving and blending and harmonising and correlating of facts that wisdom consists. It matters very little to us, if it matters at all, that Herodotus and Paracelsus were "incorrect" in detail; in Mind man moulds facts; facts never mould man; and so, in their separate ways and degrees, Herodotus and Paracelsus "stand" for wisdom—the wisdom of their age—as against mere knowledge. These men were, in to-day's speech, Adepts or Masters. Knowledge is not wisdom, as a polished stone is very rarely a diamond.

H. P. B.'s works give all the clues needed to an understanding of her life and being. For the task wherewith she was entrusted it would be impossible to imagine a more unlikely past than was hers; it was doubtful, shadowy, mysterious, compromised. Accused of fraud and spying; at one time a "spiritualist medium," with innumerable shady contacts with life and humans, it can be asserted with complete accuracy that, of all the conscious beings upon this planet of paradox and romance incredible, H. P. B. was the last to be entrusted with the custody of the Pearl of Wisdom that is the product of human tears and laughter; that Pearl that had been maturing for aeons in the Great Sea of thought. Yet the unexpected and impossible happened; paradox

again transcended platitude; the choice of the devas made the prejudices and the predilections of unenlightenment look small and mean, and pitifully inadequate. The "senders" saw from a different angle; that is all. The difference in view-point between man and deva is ultimately a mere matter of focus.

The age into which H. P. B. plunged—that is really the most appropriate word—was an age in which, in the general break-up of creed-crusts that were unable to withstand the acid tests of science, there was a real danger to western humanity that that outer crust would be mistaken for the core or *cor* itself.

Had that happened, the race (this is a magic word) of Humanity would have been retarded for an æon; for the western tradition of civilization would have lost sight entirely of the Human Goal. This nearly happened in the mid-nineteenth century; and the knowledge that this was so, and that she personally had to restore the vision of the Goal, will be found to explain much that is otherwise inexplicable in the life and labours of H. P. B.

H. P. B.'s passions, prejudices, controversies, impatiences, irritabilities, abnormalities of custom and habit, are all understandable with this key. To the truth, as she held it, she subordinated everything; her own life, work, happiness and reputation included. She was a Master; no more to be judged by human standards only than were Paracelsus or Cagliostro.

It is fatally easy to criticise the Masters; it is nearly always impossible to fathom their motives. It is they whose vision, reflected in the minds of men, leads humanity onwards. That vision sometimes, by its brilliance, blinds the visionary to the ordinary affairs of life, so easy to the average human. So, from the conventional angle, the Great Ones "act askew". They remain Great Ones, nevertheless. And a man's real spiritual worth is to be measured by his view of them.

Had sight of the Human Goal been completely lost, even for a moment, the temporary death of the Western Ideal would have ensued; this was the spiritual objective of the Dark Ones. It is not yet guessed how nearly they succeeded.

From behind the veil emerged H. P. B. with the Torch; that those who had earned the Sight might see ideas in their true relationship to Reality.

As a result of the conflict behind, what was happening in the western world? Specialised scientists on one side of the house, and religious fanatics on the other, were brawling with the Truth between them, unperceived by either army, and being pummelled and crushed to death in the conflict. H. P. B. intervened to rescue Truth ere Truth got battered beyond recognition. She succeeded. Such is her achievement.

Between religionists and scientists H. P. B. herself was all but crucified. An embodied Force,

she assailed, on the one hand, those whose evolutionary scheme stopped short at humanity, refusing to rise above it; and, on the other hand, those who mistook symbols for concrete things, events and facts. In a phrase, she was a spiritual protagonist with the opposed legions of materialism assailing her on either side.

The opposing armies had but one point in common; hatred of H. P. B., whose interest was centred in Truth Herself, and not in any partial and distorted presentation of Her. This was at the time when Truth and Her interests were almost completely subordinated to partisanship.

There is a tradition—a tradition not without considerable confirmation in history—that during the last quarter of each century a Messenger shall be sent to the West; a Messenger who shall bring light to that section of western humanity that is ready for an inner illumination. An intensified campaign occurs in the last century of a millennium. This is part of what is loosely called the Hermetic Doctrine. H. P. B. was the Light-Bearer of the nineteenth century to the western world.

A day or two ago I met the Editor of one of London's most famous weeklies; a man who is a philosopher, an "independent," a man of enormous, although specialised, erudition. He compared H. P. B. to Mrs. Eddy . . .

Those who hold this view would be less certain if they would glance at a little book—one of H. P. B.'s

minor works—called *Nightmare Tales*. The first tale has for title "A Bewitched Life". There is no particular distinction in the style; but there is so much distinction in the idea, and in the way in which the writer works it out, that it is an unassailable statement that the writer's knowledge was first-hand. No mere amateur or dabbler, no ordinary deriver, in Occultism could have written this tale, which bears the mark of the fountain-head.

I have heard a fool declare that *Zanoni* was the work of a madman. It does not occur to the fool that there may be realms of mind and being beyond his own gaze and reach. That is why he is a fool—the Fool of the Taro. The un instructed criticism of H. P. B. is just as foolish. Your orthodox religionist, in the Victorian Age, used to declare, in the abundance of his ignorance, that Evolution was not true because a man was not a monkey. He thought that that statement disposed finally of Darwin. Yet many of H. P. B.'s critics, many of whom were students of science and Darwinians, criticised, or, rather, abused H. P. B. with the same complacent ignorance wherewith the religious bigots of the period assailed Darwin. Darwin's defenders were many and influential; H. P. B.'s few and, with an exception or two, obscure.

The obscurantist children of the Dark did their damnedest to "dowse" the Lucifer of their age. By reason of a long and complicated miracle they failed. The long

and complicated miracle was H. P. B.'s charmed life.

* * *

To-day the highest and clearest thought-atmosphere is enlivened by the incalculably potent tinge brought to the western mind by H. P. B. and her circle. Before the advent of the modern Theosophical Idea, Reason, in the large, karmic sense wherein it is used by Eliphaz Lévi, had been forgotten. That Reason, an all-embracing Reason including within itself the twin doctrines of Rebirth and Fate, was restored to the West.

For centuries Europe had blundered on at the theological mercy—which is mercilessness—of rival superstitions that vented their mutual bigotries in torturings, burnings, mutilations, ostracisms. In the mid-nineteenth century these superstitions were to be vanquished by a new religion called Science, which replaced superstition by denying that there was any truth worth the title that was not scientifically provable, "scientifically" being understood strictly in a nineteenth-century, that is, religious, sense.

H. P. B. hated religion—as popularly understood—itself; and she assailed this new religion calling itself Science; partly because it was a new religion; partly because it denied the possibility of what—to her—was the only reality that counted; the Path that leads from amœba to deva. She denied the Evolutionary scheme of her century because it stopped short at men; not because it "went too far,"

as the religionists asserted; but because it did not go far enough.

H. P. B. transcended her age; just as Socrates, Bruno, Confucius, Asoka, Pythagoras, Lucretius, transcended their ages. An age grows towards the Teacher; usually after the Teacher has passed beyond the hope of earthly reward. It is the Paradox again.

Looking around Europe and Asia to-day we may find scores of societies, groups, cults, periodicals; all influenced, consciously, by the heritage of idea—the agelong wisdom—that H. P. B. restored to the West. The White Group that is said to hold the destinies of Europe in its "gift" chose the most improbable instrument conceivable because it was to prove the most efficient. Once again, it is all a question of focus; and the Intelligences that

despatched H. P. B. as Messenger to her Age did not err. Her mission has been accomplished. She changed the current of European thought, directing it towards the sun.

Between two fires of idea the modern world is scorched; two tyrannies, both seeking as prey and prize the soul of man, beset us. Our Youth, in despair, knows not to which—if to either—to turn for aid. There is the hope that it will not turn. Before it lies the path that stretches from the beginnings of life to beyond a divinity incarnate—into Samadhi, and, it may be, beyond. No man, possibly no god, knows. But the very existence of the Path was forgotten in Europe until H. P. B. re-discovered it for herself, and announced her re-discovery to the West.

VICTOR B. NEUBURG

Travellers have met these adepts on the shores of the sacred Ganges, brushed against them in the silent ruins of Thebes, and in the mysterious deserted chambers of Luxor. Within the halls upon whose blue and golden vaults the weird signs attract attention, but whose secret meaning is never penetrated by the idle gazers, they have been seen but seldom recognized. Historical memoirs have recorded their presence in the brilliantly illuminated *salons* of European aristocracy. They have been encountered again on the arid and desolate plains of the Great Sahara, as in the caves of Elephanta. They may be found everywhere, but make themselves known only to those who have devoted their lives to unselfish study, and are not likely to turn back.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 17.

WHAT IS THERE WORTH SAVING IN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION?

[Count Carlo Sforza, a direct descendant from the famous ruling family of Milan, has served his country Italy at different times as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as Ambassador to France. From the very first he found himself in opposition to the Fascist regime, and though still a member of the Italian Senate, he is unable to express his views freely in his own country, so he has devoted himself of late years to lecturing in American Universities on the responsibilities of the World War and other political problems. He is the author of *Makers of Modern Europe* and other books, and is a contributor to leading journals and periodicals both in England and America. M. Jean Guéhenno, a Frenchman, gave in our January issue his answer to the problem, What is worth saving in European Civilization? Now we have the view of a Liberal Italian. It would be interesting to hear the point of view of a follower of Mussolini, Stalin, or Hitler. Every school of political opinion must have some contribution to make on such a subject, and from their united views it might be possible that some satisfactory answer to the problem might be educed.—Eds.]

What is there worth saving in European civilization?

The question looks terrible.

In reality one simply needs sincerity to answer it; because it cannot mean more than this—what our deepest feelings tell us about the present state of the world. A psychological confession; nothing more.

To make my answer easier I shall begin by stating what seems to me worst in Europe—from a moral point of view.

In my opinion Europe is still paying the penalty of that monstrous crime—the war. We, who fought during the war, we, who are the survivors, too often forget that beside us fell—during four terrible years—the most generous, the most ardent, of all our comrades. For my part, when I am thinking again of the war I recall at once certain pure Italian friends of mine, about whom I had always thought that they were a marvel-

lous promise for the moral and intellectual Europe of to-morrow.

Now this loss seems forgotten; *les morts vont vite*, as the French proverb says.

What seems even more forgotten is that during four years of war all the Europeans were taught that blind obedience was a national virtue—even in the field of the spirit; that military discipline was to be applied even to the most stupid theories prevailing, under different forms, in all the belligerent countries.

Truly, all Europeans have gone during the war and the after-war through an intellectual degradation, which explains how Fascism came to be possible in Italy and Nazism in Germany. Like pustules on a sick body, these political phenomena are nothing else than external manifestations of an even more general disease; and if they appeared in Italy and in Germany rather than in France or Great

Britain, it so happened simply because the material sufferings of the Italian masses had been more severe during the war than those of the French; and because Germany, contrary to Great Britain, had already, spread through her own veins, the old poison of pompous and crude Bismarckian dictatorship.

The recovery of Europe's moral health will be very slow. To rule and to be ruled by fear degrades ruler and ruled alike. The mental prostration under dogmas, formulae and men (exalted to-day by order, forgotten to-morrow by order, as happens all the time in Germany, Italy and Russia) is, in the long run, morally lowering. And it ends by creating habits of thought so deep-rooted as to remain after the causes have gone.

The very experiment of Dictatorships has already proved that Liberalism and Democracy are the only ideas still worth saving in European civilization. Their work during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth has been only the initial prologue of human liberation. Liberalism and Democracy are still to be, with changed methods, the instruments of human freedom—political and moral.

What, in fact, ails Europe to-day? That her bounds are too strait for her economic and intellectual potentialities. In the midst of so

much hatred and so much lack of comprehension, this assertion may appear Panglossian. And yet, has not the big change come about under our very eyes? Thirty years ago one could be English, French or Italian... Nowadays one cannot. Those very writers who furnish the gospels of nationalistic hatreds would be desperate if their books were not read, translated, commented on beyond their frontiers. Our needs, intellectual and economic, run over our frontiers; German problems, Italian problems, become at once European problems.

Before this novel fact one has a right to wonder whether agitations for formulae of hatred which can be catalogued according to the colour of the shirts are not like unto the growing violence of bombardments on a front several miles long during the war—the terrifying but glad announcement of an imminent retreat of the enemy.

It may be, perhaps, that the crisis will be too long for our lives to witness the end of it. And it will be certain that this crisis is going to leave long marks of degradation, moral and intellectual... But our lives do not matter. For those of us who have neither ambitions nor hatreds it is joy enough to feel that the future will vindicate our loyalty to the ideals without which nothing would be worth saving in European civilization.

CARLO SFORZA

THE PRESENT CRISIS IN WESTERN CULTURE

[Dr. F. S. C. Northrop is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. Since he occupies such an important position in the world of learning, it is scarcely necessary to say that he is the possessor of many academic distinctions. He has studied in Germany and England as well as in his own country. He is the Secretary-Treasurer of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Member of the American Physical Society, etc., etc. He is author of *Science and First Principles* and contributes to numerous journals, among which is our own, for he wrote in THE ARYAN PATH of June 1932 on "The Philosophical Foundations of World Understanding". The following article shows how the trend of events in one civilization is the outcome of the thoughts and ideas of the philosophers and sages of former eras. The noumena of one age become the phenomena of a succeeding age.—EDS.]

Western civilization is facing a crisis. This fact requires no emphasis. It is evident on every hand. However, profound insight, born of an understanding of the metaphysical foundations of culture, is required to appreciate its deep-rooted significance.

In a previous issue of this journal,* and more fully elsewhere,† the writer considered the history of Western Civilization in the light of the fundamental metaphysical issue of the relation between matter and forms. If the characteristics and differences between the Middle Ages, the Scholastic Period (1450-1600) and the Modern World are to be understood, the three philosophical systems, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Democratean materialism, to which the problem of matter and form gives rise, must be kept clearly in mind.

Nevertheless, there is another metaphysical issue, equally profound and fundamental, which is more illuminating with reference

to the present crisis. I refer to the metaphysical problem of the one and the many. This issue raises the question whether reality is one thing or many things, whether continuity or discontinuity, geometry or arithmetic, organized autocratic theism, or skeptical, sophistic, democratic humanism, is the more fundamental.

This metaphysical issue is inadequate as a basis for distinguishing between the three major periods of Western culture after the Greek Era, since it draws only a dyadic distinction. Hence, according to it the Middle Ages and the Scholastic Period fall together, since Medieval Platonism and Aristotelian Scholasticism are both monistic; from the point of view of the problem of the one and the many, Plato's Idea of the Good, as historically interpreted, and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, are practically equivalent: Both provide intellectual foundations for unity. But this very fact puts the pre-Modern World into

* Vol. III, 368-376.

† *Science and First Principles*, 1931, New York and Cambridge.

direct and sharp contrast with the Modern World, and thereby simplifies the issue involved in the intense social, spiritual, and intellectual crisis through which the Western soul is now passing.

The definiteness of this contrast appears if we examine any sphere of human thought or any social institution. Consider the purely intellectual phase of human experience. In the Medieval and Scholastic periods all educated men were dominated by Plato's Idea of the Good, as made explicit in Augustine's *City of God*, and as actualized on earth in Western Latin Europe in the One Catholic Church Roman, and in Eastern Europe in the Orthodox Church Greek; or they were taught Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. This meant that every informed intelligent person took it for granted that rational unity is intrinsic in the very nature of things. Thus the intellectual foundations for the unity, necessary to build civilization, were at hand. It is this single scientific and religious concept of unity, born out of the empirical investigations of Egyptian, Babylonian and Greek scientists, and crystallized and made applicable to every phase of thought and experience, human, social and divine, by the great Greek scientific philosophers, that makes Western Europe the home of a civilization rather than the mere stamping ground of a lot of fighting tribes. Without this basic intelligible, divine principle of unity, this principle of the rational one, demonstrated as eternal and primary for Western mankind by

Greek mathematics and astronomy and made explicit and articulate in the very depths of man's being by Plato and Aristotle, Western Culture as we know it, would not exist; there would be no Saint Augustine with the Church Invisible, no Holy Fathers and Popes with their Church Visible, no Saint Thomas with his *Summa Theologiae*, or Dante with the *Divina Commedia*, nor any Greek orthodox Church, or European Russia with its Caesars and Patriarchs. All these, and countless other factors, representing the very soul and substance of Western Civilization in the Medieval and Scholastic Periods, are the fruition of the thoughts and actions of men who were dominated by the binding, organizing, overpowering and soul-sustaining concept of unity.

And precisely for this reason all these beliefs and institutions are, even when present, utterly alien and foreign to the Modern World. It is utterly impossible to imagine a Nicene Council made up of Newton, Descartes, Voltaire, and Hume. A single authoritative Catholic Church arising spontaneously out of the soil of the seventeenth and eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is unthinkable. Such doctrines and such institutions require, as the barest essentials for their existence, intellectual foundations for unity, and such foundations do not exist after 1600.

The opening of the Modern World makes this clear. Galilei's reflections and experiments founded, what he most aptly termed,

the new science of local motion. Even Moderns have failed to sense the full significance of this. Galilei's word "local" is the key to the story. Local masses and locally measurable forces were revealed as the basic causes of the orbits of astronomy and the order of nature. Given these *many* masses and their *many* motions and gravitational effects, the orbits of the heavenly bodies can be deduced, Newton demonstrated. Also given a disintegration of the stellar masses, the orbits could change or disappear. With one stroke, the empirically-grounded, supposedly eternal orbits of Greek astronomy, the cosmologically verified rational unity of Greek and Medieval thought, were smashed. When Newton and Laplace derived Kepler's laws for planetary motion, and the irregularities in the Moon's orbit, from the mere compounding of inertial and accelerative forces, the rational one was revealed as a mere effect of the physical many, the Western World's intellectual foundations for unity were destroyed, and the whole structure of Medieval and Scholastic civilization came tumbling down. The Church Visible remained, but the soul of and rational ground for its being, the Church Invisible, was gone. The materialistic pluralism of Democritus replaced the rationalistic monism of Plato and Aristotle, and a civilization reared on dualism in epistemology and the principle of plurality in metaphysics was in the making.

What happened first in astronomy and physics with Galilei and

Newton was repeated later in mathematics with Dedekind and Cantor. Irrational numbers and fractions were defined in terms of classes of natural numbers, the geometrical, and the number, continuum were reduced to arithmetic, and the principle of the many again triumphed. Two steps further, made by Frege and Russell, and the principle of the many applied to logic, also, the very elements of thought itself; logical atomism was the result; instead of the one idea of the Good, thought found itself with nothing but the many motion of "such that," "and," and "or," etc.

Education followed. The Scholastic Method with its Trivium and Quadrivium, its planned education, with logic, rhetoric, medicine, mathematics, etc., each in its place, and all culminating in the metaphysical theology of a Saint Thomas, went into disrepute. In its place came the unorganized specialization of the sciences, the degeneration of philosophy into a special restricted subject such as ethics or epistemology, the departmentalization of the universities, culminating in its fruits, in the widely educated masses for whom the psychology of advertising is as profound a subject as physics or metaphysics, and to whom all concepts are of equivalent importance and none clearly defined.

This transition from the principle of unity to the principle of plurality grips politics also. First there was the Holy Roman Empire, meaningless and impossible for an age without intellectual founda-

tions for unity. It is true that the movement toward nationalism began before the Modern Era opened. But even so, in the Scholastic Period, it was holding fast to unity. Then, there was no nationalism of democracies. There could be many states but in each state the principle of unity was supreme; for there must be a King. Moreover, even the many Kings must recognize the still remaining primacy of unity: hence the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, and the necessity of Royal intermarriages in order to possess this Divine Right. It is not until the physics of the seventeenth century has inspired the political philosophy and economic theory of the eighteenth century that the government of the many, the rule of the masses, begins to become a reality. Even as late as 1690, the English philosopher Locke had to attack my namesake Filmer who defended the Divine Right of Kings. It is not necessary to trace the transition further. The rule of the many in politics, and in business has been upon us. We know what a culture reared upon the many individuals who recognize no restricting, justice-producing sanction of unity, means. Those who lived in the United States in the years 1932 and 1933 will never forget it.

The transition from unity to plurality in religious thought is equally interesting, and if anything more tragic. We have noted how Plato's Idea of the Good and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover provided intellectual foundations for

unity in Western Culture. It is to be remembered how Plato's naturalistic rational idealism provided the bridge by which Augustine passed from Manicheanism to Christianity, and how he, having made this journey of the mind and spirit, outlined the City of God and made explicit the Church Invisible. This Platonic Augustinian Christianity with its phenomenalistic theory of matter and the attendant otherworldliness, provided intellectual foundations for the rationality, unity and authority of the Earthly Catholic Church Visible, and dominated, in its doctrine, and its inevitable ascetic consequences, the course of civilization up to the tenth and twelfth centuries. Then came the Arabs to Spain with the real texts and materials of Greek knowledge, and their frank Aristotelianism. It is to be noted that the transition toward the pluralism of Protestantism from the unity of Catholicism began in the Scholastic Period.

However, an examination of the philosophical foundations of the Scholastic Period will show that Luther's move in no way violated the primacy of the principle of unity, nor was the Reformation ever a mere historical incident. The metaphysical foundations of the Scholastic Period are Aristotelian. It is an essential point in the Aristotelian metaphysics that matter is present as well as form. Moreover, one of the functions of matter is to introduce the individualizing principle. The importance of this becomes evident when one remembers that there is only

one instance of a pure form. It is matter which permits the one pure form to participate or appear in a large number of instances. The relevance of this for Catholicism is most evident. It draws a sharp distinction between the one Church Invisible, the Form of which has but one instance, and the earthly material Roman Church Visible which, on Aristotelian principles, need be but one of many instances of the single Church Invisible. Up to the coming of the Arabs to Spain this Aristotelianism would not make itself felt in Western Europe but after their coming it did. Dante was one of the first to take up the distinction. The moral character of the Popes during the Italian Renaissance did not help matters. Luther, attacking the corruption in the Church Visible, took up Dante's theme. The point to be noted is that the authority of the Visible Church at Rome could be repudiated safely by Luther in 1517 without destroying religion and the foundations for unity in Western Culture, because the authority of the Church Invisible still remained; the metaphysical monism of Plato and Aristotle was still valid.

But Luther and the Reformation did not reckon with the coming of Galilei and Newton. With the new physics, the authority of the Church Invisible was also destroyed: the cosmological argument for the existence of God was no longer valid. Protestantism having repudiated the authority of the Visible Church, and Newtonian physics having destroyed the eternal

rational order of the astronomical universe, which was the basis for the Invisible Church, the Modern World faced the necessity of losing its religion.

What was true of religion was equally true of politics and the State. The pluralistic foundations of modern culture meant that the source of political as well as religious authority was to be shifted from the one representative of God, the King or Pope, to the many consciences of the many individuals. As Plato saw long ago, when he wrote the Republic, this means skepticism in religion and knowledge, relativity in ethics, and chaos in the State. For the shifting of the source of religious belief and political principle from the one God to the many men, meant that no measure existed for man, and that man was made the measure of things. This means neither faith nor knowledge, but mere opinion and sophistry. Man had freedom of belief but nothing in which to believe. The many had freedom of political action but no unifying justice-producing principle to prevent them from destroying each other by the clash of their many interests. To perceive that the Modern World has attempted to rear culture on nothing but pluralism, is to realize the meaning of the present crisis in Western Civilization: The Modern World has at last attained the consequences of its own premises.

Such is the tragic meaning of contemporary events in the Western World. But the present crisis has a deeper and more hopeful

meaning. This *reductio ad absurdum* of the modern principle of the many has affected not merely religion and politics, but physics and mathematics also. This means that the traditional modern assumptions that reality is merely a many, can no longer be assumed as final. In short, intellectual foundations for unity are again a possibility.

Space permits but brief reference to the scientific considerations necessary to justify this conclusion: In traditional modern physics, the universe was conceived as a mere aggregate of microscopic particles moving in an absolute space. Nature as a whole had no structural constancy and no causal unity. No basis for a unity, either formal or physical, existed. In order to keep this theory in accord with new evidence, it was necessary to introduce an absolute time series, and an absolute electromagnetic field, or ether. All these additions represented structural continuous factors. In 1905 and 1916, Einstein showed that none of these absolutes exists as an entity independent of matter, but that the structural constancy and continuity of space and the ether is the structure and continuity of matter itself. More recently the wave, as well as the atomic, character of matter has been experimentally demonstrated. In short, physical nature seems to be both one and many.

In mathematics Cantor's reduction of the continuum to the many natural numbers has been demonstrated to lead to contradictions. The final solution of this difficulty

is not a topic upon which mathematicians agree. It has been admitted, however, by those who have worked the hardest to retain the modern theory of mathematics (e.g., Ramsey), that its exclusive pluralism is inadequate. Also two of the most profound students of the problem (Brouwer and Weyl) have frankly accepted the continuum as primary and would derive the many from it by abstraction and the constructive activity of the thinker.

These two developments in contemporary physics and mathematics are sufficient to show that the Modern World has come to its end. They are sufficient to show also that the crucial problem facing us in physics, in the issue between field theories and atomic theories, and in mathematics, in the issue between the logical atomism of Russell and the intuitively-given continuum of Weyl, is the old metaphysical problem of the one and the many, which we have used from the outset as the key to our analysis.

What direction will the solution of this problem take? The final answer which our day gives to this question will determine the character of Western Culture in the coming Post-Modern Era. There are signs, in fact decisive considerations, which indicate that new intellectual foundations for unity are to be found. The danger is that we revert back to pure monism and lose the lesson which all the travail of the Modern World has taught us. This would be a mistake. The Modern World was

not born of error, but of one-half of the truth: there is a real many and there are the temporal forms which only the motion of a real many can provide. This is the Modern World's permanent contribution to Western Culture. But also there is the one, a primary principle of unity. This is the truth enshrined in Medieval culture which we find we cannot do without. In short, there is both a real one and a real many. But to get these two together without contradiction is the crucial problem. There are many systems of philosophy which provide one without the other; but none, to my knowledge, in the Western World at least, which consistently retains both. Stated in metaphysical terms, this means that the principle of unity of Platonism and Aristotelianism must be combined with the principle of pluralism of the philosophy of Democritus and the physics of Newton. The metaphysical significance of the macroscopic atomic theory, proposed elsewhere* by the present author, consists in the fact that it

attempts to do precisely this.

If it succeeds, or if some other equivalent reconciliation of the one with the many arises out of the apparent confusions and contradictions of our present experience, then we can say that the present crisis in Western Culture has even a deeper meaning: It signifies that the West, finding truth in the unity enshrined in the Medieval World, as well as in the plurality discovered in the Modern World, is ceasing to be divided against itself, and is passing, by means of its Medieval thesis and Modern antithesis, into a true synthesis which is the fulfilment, and, let us hope, the more peaceful realization, of its own full being.

It is to be emphasized, however, that this fulfilment of its own real potentialities will be actualized in the West only when, in addition to the union of matter and form, and the one and the many, it adds quale or the psychical. When this is done it should be possible, as my earlier article† in this journal suggested, for East and West to understand each other.

F. S. C. NORTHRUP

* *Science and First Principles*, 1931, New York and Cambridge.
† Vol. III, 368-374.

KINDLING THE FIRE

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—Eds.]

He who, unattached to the fruit of his actions, performeth such actions as should be done is both a renouncer of action (Sannyasi) and a devotee of right action (Yogi); not he who liveth without kindling sacrificial fire and without ceremonies.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, VI. 1.

We must have an historical setting for this verse. Its definitions are contrary to those to be found in the ancient record of Shruti, left behind by Sages and Seers. Also in the Smriti, the Persistent Tradition rooted in memory-experience, and in Yoga-Shastras, actual Instructions to aspirants for Sannyasa and Yoga. Literally speaking, the Great Master goes contrary to established accepted definitions. Why?

The first third of the *Gita* is devoted to an examination of the then existing schools of thought, every one of which suffered from accretions and misinterpretations. The great art of Sannyasa and Yoga had also been corrupted. The synthesis which like a Sutratma connects all points of view (Darshanas) was broken. The first six chapters of the *Gita* restore the synthesis, and in doing this they naturally point out the errors, by

emphasizing the true points of view. These chapters are neither an attack on the false, nor a defence of the true, but a restoration of the lines of thought, at every deflection.

The position taken up by so-called Sannyasis and Yogis, 5,000 years ago, must have been something like that of our free-thinkers, who are only nominally free from the bondage of bias and fanaticism. In reality proud rationalists argue without any basis of reason and knowledge; their minds are fast bound by desires and fancy. They proceed by the negative route: we are not this, we are not that, we do not believe, we do not accept—not, not, not. The moment they begin to define what they are, and formulate their principles of ethics and of philosophy according to which they view life they become confounded. In the days when Shri Krishna taught, the Sannyasis and

Yogis were taking this negative route: their proud boast was that they performed no rites and ceremonies, they kindled no fire, and so on. Yet a hundred deeds bound them fast to their pride, and much talk kindled the fire by friction, producing disunity and confusion all round. These nominal Yogis took the path of irresponsibility and indolence: they readily accepted what they should *not* do, but as readily rejected what they must do. They assumed virtues of omission but not of commission, and so the former became deadly sins.

On the other hand this verse has been exploited by the orthodox who make out that the *Gita* recommends performance of religious rites. It does not. And yet it does. It certainly does not support the view of religious orthodoxy. How can it? Synthesis of philosophies rises above and goes beyond any and every caste and race, creed and religion. Unless we look upon the *Gita* as Instruction for the human soul we are bound to be confused, now by one verse, now by another. Therefore if the *Gita* recommends performance of any ceremony it can only be such as is performed by the human Soul.

This is the first lesson of the verse. Secondly, it tells the aspirant to righteous living and soul-freedom what should be done. Not only does the *Gita* expose what is false, but it also expounds what is true. It does not only say what a man ought not to do, but is positive and practical and says what ought to be practised. Actions must be done;

fruits of action must not be allowed to interfere with that performance. What must not be done are deeds which are not duties; and duties must be done with an eye to present duties not to their future results. Thus a man is to be known not by what he does not do, but by what he actually does. Apply that to our present-day Sannyasis: do not judge by what they abjure in the name of their discipline, but by what they do and practise.

This is the second lesson of the verse.

The aspirant to Righteous Life, called upon to do duties and to renounce fruits of actions, sorely needs some basic principle for this exercise. This the verse offers—indirectly and by implication. The nature of the actor, the doer of duties, has to be understood. Action is like energy—prana; its result is a form—rupa or body; but it is the actor who alone determines, like the Soul, actions and their results. Most men act unconsciously, that is, without any reference to or without any knowledge of the nature of the actor. If active doing brought peace and illumination our active civilization would be highly enlightened and calm. No—there are too many actions without a cognisance of the actor, with the result that the world is afire and burning up with bad deeds and good deeds, but all thoughtless deeds. Fire is necessary, but not knowing the art of kindling it we are suffering from actions; the reaction will be towards non-action like those of the Sannyasis we mentioned.

This verse contains, most appropriately, the secret of kindling the fire; this instruction forms the heart of the verse; because it is hidden it is very often missed. This particular Instruction of the *Gita* is named Dhyana-Yoga; it is knowledge about meditation of a particular kind; in verse 46 it is shown that by this Dhyana the man attains to the superior position of a Dhyani. He is superior to the man of penances and austerities; superior also to the man of learning and even to the doer of noble deeds. He who becomes a member of this Order belongs to the Heart of the spiritual world. It is the most mysterious and secret Order whose father-head is Marichi, according to some texts. These Dhyanis are also known as Vairajas, whom fire cannot consume, because their bodies are composed of the highest essences of Fire. They are men's real friends, guides and teachers, for They are the makers of Geniuses and Instructors. They kindle the latent Soul-fire in the Race and feed it, from time to time, lest it go out. They feed that Soul-fire in each of us by pointing out where the fuel of knowledge is and how it can be used.

The human Soul is born of Fire and is of the nature of fire (agni-jata); his body is the fire-censer (agni-dhana); his foremost duty is preserving and nourishing that fire (agni-rakshana). If we do not

want to go wrong we must make that fire the eternal witness of all our deeds. In the marriage rite fire is the symbol of faith and love, which consume every impurity, and of creative wisdom. But that rite itself is the representative of the higher marriage between ourselves and the divinities of our Higher Selves, and it is that union which enables the Spirit-Soul to create Soul-children of radiant fiery-form (agni-rupa); this is what the true Gurus do, for Their chelas are Their children.

In the old rite of Agni-Shtoma the mystery of this Order of Dhyanis was revealed.* In our verse of the *Gita* the real Sannyasi and Yogi is one who knows how to preserve the Soul-fire in himself; also how to kindle it in others. He is a constant performer of ceremonies, without a thought of reward; these acts are tongues of fire and proceed from within the heart where that fire ever burns. These sacrificial acts or tongues of Soul-fire ascend towards Tapo-loka, the world of Those Dhyanis and they receive the grains of incense thrown for the blessing of our world by the Great Lords. Thus also it is not the chela, but the chela's good sacrifices and noble acts of Soul, which attract the help and the blessing of the Guru. Actions bind the actor, not to actions but to the Great Actors when we perform deeds without caring for their fruits and rewards.

B. M.

* It is the ceremony or sacrifice performed at Spring time and it extends over several days; its symbology refers to the birth of self-consciousness caused by the higher pitris according to Hinduism, to the fall of angels according to Christianity, which process is fully discussed by H. P. Blavatsky in the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*.—EDS.

THE FREE MAN ACCORDING TO MARXIAN PHILOSOPHY

[John Middleton Murry gives us his interpretation of Karl Marx's ideal of the free man. It is doubtful, however, whether most communists or socialists would accept even in theory that "the freedom of a truly free man was the knowledge and acceptance of his own determination". The "knowing" aspect of our determination should necessarily involve something more than the merely materialistic interpretation of life and the historical process.—EDS.]

The great maxim of Marxian philosophy concerning Free-Will is taken bodily from Hegel: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity." That, to many, seems a barren paradox; to some, indeed, almost a bad joke. To others it is a word of deliverance. In which of these two opposed classes we are to be reckoned depends primarily, I think, upon the side from which we approach the maxim: whether from the inside or the outside. Inside and outside, in such a connection, are manifest metaphors. To approach a gnomic and mysterious statement from the inside means chiefly to have shared the experience which underlies the statement, and of which the statement is the crystallisation: whereas to approach it from the outside means that one has no such clue in one's own experience. "We read fine things," said Keats, "but we only understand them when we have gone the same steps as the author." To read the "fine thing" before one has gone the same steps as the author—that is to approach wisdom from the outside; to read it after those steps have been trodden—this is to approach it from the inside.

Now, the statement: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity" has

deep and obvious affinities with other mysterious sayings. A close parallel to it could be found in the secret wisdom of all high religions: and I have no doubt at all that the experience which underlies that statement is essentially 'religious'. To me, it is the bare and austere modern form of an identical realization which has been expressed in other times and places in a different idiom. But, for the moment at any rate, we will confine ourselves to seeking affinities in the relatively modern wisdom of the West. Hegel, from whom Marx took the word, was deeply influenced by Spinoza, and in Spinoza we find a doctrine essentially the same. Let us note first what Marx, following Hegel, actually says. He does not say, as many of the "outside approach" appear to imagine, that "Freedom is Necessity"; he says that "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity." The Freedom consists in the knowledge. If a man is ignorant (as most men are) of the Necessity which he unwittingly obeys, he is not free. What I am seeking to emphasise is that Marx does not deny Freedom; he is asserting true Freedom against false Freedom—the reality of Freedom against the appearance of Freedom:

and he is asserting that the reality of Freedom is achieved when a man becomes conscious, fully aware, of Necessity.

The doctrine of Spinoza is that, in the 'natural' state, a man is the mere vehicle of "passion": that is to say, he is the mere passive subject of experience. The necessary, salutary and crucial change takes place in him when "passion" is transmuted into "act". This transmutation is achieved by the Reason (which has, of course, nothing to do with the mechanical intelligence). When a man, by the operation of Reason, becomes aware of his own fundamental "passivity," then his "passions" are transmuted into "act". Put into a form parallel to that of the Marxian-Hegelian statement, Spinoza's doctrine is that "Activity is knowledge of passivity". The statements are, in reality, identical.

In other words, conscious adult Man is the point at which the Necessity which governs the Universe becomes conscious of itself. And this all-pervading Necessity is not in the least mechanical. On the contrary, it is dynamic. It is a Necessity of the same order which prevails in the growth of a tree, or any other living thing. When a man becomes conscious that he also is completely subject to this dynamic Necessity, his consciousness ceases to be at odds with his instincts; he is re-integrated into the process or life of the whole. He is liberated—to use the terms of William Blake—from his Selfhood

and enters into his Identity.* Whereas, when he refused to acknowledge his "passivity," he was distraught and weakened by internal conflict, claiming for himself a status in the Universe which his actual behaviour belied, now, when he accepts his true status, the conflict is resolved, and he becomes a pure Instrument of the Life-process, which many men have called God. This condition of pure instrumentality—which is the same as the condition of "perfect service" in Christian idiom—is the condition of pure "activity". The ethical corollary is that no pure "activity" can have its source in the Selfhood. Only when the Selfhood is in abeyance, or "annihilated," as Blake said, is pure activity possible. And this is the profound truth which is expressed in the great prayer of Jesus of Nazareth: "Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt."

This religious and ethical wisdom has, inevitably, undergone re-statement after re-statement during the advance of the intellectual consciousness in the West. That advance has been marked by an effort to achieve an ever-deepening and more comprehensive idea of Nature. This has gone hand in hand with a steady diminution of the province of Super-nature, or the cosmological God. At the moment when Nature could be conceived, or more truly "imagined," as one all-inclusive living process, the need of Super-nature, or cosmological God,

* Much the same distinction is expressed by others as the distinction between the Ego and the true Self.

began in the finest minds to disappear. The first clear statement of this non-supernatural religion appeared in the opening of Book III of Spinoza's *Ethics*, where he shows himself fully aware of the breach he was making in traditional religious thought.

Now the 'religious' potentiality of this re-integration of Man into Nature depends directly upon the depth of the idea of Nature. For Spinoza Nature was absolutely non-mechanical. Spatiality and thought were modes of the all-comprehending, all-pervading "substance," or "God". That meant that he did not subordinate human nature to non-human nature, as the "materialists" or "determinists" vainly do. The character and laws of Nature were revealed no less in specifically human nature than in the non-human. All that was required in order that the process of Nature should work freely in man was that, by the birth of Reason in himself, he should know himself as subject to that process: by that act of submission the nature of the process could declare itself in and through him. Under the mode of thought the law of the process was discovered to culminate in the *amor intellectualis Dei*: or, as Spinoza boldly declared, the experience of God loving Himself through Man.

This may seem remote from the Marxian realization; but, in fact, the relation between them is intimate indeed. Marx did not develop for himself a complete philosophical-religious position as Spinoza did. A religious philosophy exists

in Marx's work in the state of implication merely. The conditions of the age in which he lived enforced upon him a complete devotion to "revolutionary" activity. But the crucial point to be realised is that this life of activity to which Marx dedicated himself was the consummation of the religious-philosophical resolution which he had inherited from Spinoza through Hegel. Philosophically and historically, the great achievement in which Marx justly took pride, of standing Hegel's philosophy "on its feet again," whereas before it had been standing on its head, was a re-assertion of Spinozism from the perversions to which Hegel had submitted it. What Marx took from Hegel was then reduced to his adoption of the "dialectic," or the appropriate logic for the description of living process. It is therefore within the Spinozist "frame of reference," rather than the Hegelian, that the philosophic contribution of Marx can be most clearly apprehended. Marx more fully explored the nature of the "passivity" of man than was possible for Spinoza, in days when the science of history was embryonic. He demonstrated the historic modality under which the blind *vis existendi* of Spinoza had been compelled to operate—the compulsive influence of the technique of production on the structure of society and thence on the transitory legal conceptions which appeared as absolute to the unliberated mind. Thus we may fairly say that Marx developed Spinozism on the historical side, or that he dotted the i's and crossed

the t's of the Spinozist affirmation that "Activity is knowledge of passivity".

I fancy that the deep affinity between these two great modern thinkers is not unconnected with the fact that both were Jews; and I believe that the great function of the Jewish genius has been to mediate between the speculative genius of the East and the practical genius of the West. Hence it is that Europe owes to Jewry the essence of its own religion: indeed, the Western idea of religion consists, I should say, precisely in this synthesis of the Eastern speculative and the Western practical which has come to it through Jewry. Hence, again, the simple fact, (generally unnoticed) that the eleventh of Marx's crucial "Theses on Feuerbach"—"Philosophers have merely given different interpretations of the world; the task is now to change it"—is, substantially, a vindication of religion from both philosophy and theology. For the effort of religion in the Western sense has always been "to change the world". And Marx was perfectly aware of the "religious" affinity of his own effort. Not merely is the famous essay "On Hegel's Philosophy of Law," which begins with the declaration that understanding of religion is the pre-condition of all understanding, one of the most profound religious criticisms of religion that have ever been made, but the evidence of the statement in the 8th Thesis on Feuerbach is peremptory.

All life in society is essentially practical. All mysteries, which divert

speculation into mysticism, find their rational solution in human activity and the understanding of this activity.

That is to say, the mysticism of speculation is the phase which passes into, and is transcended by, complete human activity. This complete human activity Marx calls "revolutionary, i. e., practical-critical". The phrase seems clumsy; but that is because Marx was striving to express a new realization. "Practical-critical" is precisely the synthesis of 'speculative' and 'active'. And this synthesis is achieved when the knowledge of passivity, or Necessity, is complete in any individual at any given moment in human history. Such a synthesis produces now a Jesus, now a Spinoza, now a Marx. That their objective problems were different goes without saying: that is the meaning of Marx's own pregnant statement that Humanity never sets itself problems but those which it is able to solve. But on the subjective side the essential wisdom is the same. "Freedom is knowledge of necessity."

What changes there are in the practical consequences of this "Freedom" depend upon changes in the extent and character of the knowledge. With every century changes, major or minor, take place within the realm of Necessity, and the faculty of knowledge develops to recognise them. Marx emerged at the critical moment when the social morality of competitive individualism—itself a new development since the feudal era in the West—was blindly confront-

ing the new technical phenomenon of machine-production. Marx ruled out, instinctively as a Westerner, the possibility of "scrapping the machine". He saw that a conflict between the "bourgeois" habit of competitive individualism and the economic necessities engendered by machine-production was inevitable; and he saw that this conflict was taking and would take the form of a struggle of the working-class to make their human rights prevail against the inexorable degradation with which the competitive use of machine-production must threaten them. In other words, since the machine could not be scrapped, human beings would be. Eventually, these human beings would rebel against their degradation, and would overthrow "bourgeois" society. But they would have to understand the cause of their degradation—the necessity in which they were enmeshed. To the task of educating them into "the freedom which is knowledge of necessity" Marx devoted his life.

Why did Marx do it? He was not a member of the class threatened with degradation. In the "Communist Manifesto" he describes his own case.

Finally, in times when the class-struggle is nearing the decisive points, the process of disintegration in the ruling-class becomes so violent, that a small portion of the ruling-class separates from it and joins the revolutionary class—the class which holds the future in its hands. Just as formerly a portion of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, now a portion of the bourgeoisie

goes over to the proletariat—in particular a number of bourgeois thinkers who have raised themselves to the level of a theoretical understanding of the whole historical process.

But why, one may still ask, does a theoretical understanding of the dynamic movement of history produce this effect in men to whom, as to Marx, it can bring no advantage whatever, but only a life of contumely and suffering? And no rational answer is possible. One can say that understanding of this kind is possible only by a great effort of self-detachment: that it is a form, in the West the authentic contemporary form, of self-annihilation. Or one can appeal to the great maxim itself: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity." But if one had asked Marx: Was he, in taking this crucial decision to devote his whole life to the proletarian cause, 'free' or was he 'determined'? I am sure he would have smiled, because he knew that the freedom of a truly free man was the knowledge and acceptance of his own determination. Then he might have appealed to the Hegelian dialectic, and pointed out that "Free-Will" and "Determinism" are thesis and antithesis: their synthesis was what chiefly mattered—*worauf es ankommt*. Such a synthesis he experienced and was: for the conflict between Free-Will and Determinism was one, and perhaps the chief, of the mysteries whose solution by Reason was found in creative and therefore 'revolutionary' activity: to which the life of Marx was given.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

PRALAYA IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE

[Our readers will remember the very instructive series of articles that Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E., contributed last year on "Modern Science and The Secret Doctrine," wherein he compared the latest scientific teachings on Space, Time and Motion with what Mme. Blavatsky had written nearly fifty years ago in her monumental work, *The Secret Doctrine*. This month he treats of the Doctrine of Pralaya as it is being interpreted by science to-day. Dr. Hart is the author of *Makers of Science*, *The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci*, *The Great Physicists* and numerous text-books on Physics. Some time ago he was an honorary Research Assistant in the department of the History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London.—EDS.]

Students of *The Secret Doctrine* are no doubt familiar with the correlated conceptions of Manvantara and Pralaya. These are discussed, apart from several incidental references, in Chapter VII of Part II of Book I of Madame Blavatsky's great work. They are Periods, or Kalpas, of activity and of rest—of the ordered development of the Universe in the case of Manvantara (*Manvantara*, or between the Manus), and the periods of dissolution (Pralaya) which succeed them. There are degrees of Manvantara and Pralaya, minor and major. A quick summary, given in a footnote to p. 172 of Book I of *The Secret Doctrine*, reads thus:—

Occultism divides the periods of Rest (Pralaya) into several kinds: there is the *individual* pralaya of each Globe, as humanity and life pass on to the next; seven minor Pralayas in each Round; the *Planetary* Pralaya, when seven Rounds are completed; the *Solar* Pralaya, when the whole system is at an end; and finally the Universal Maha—or Brahmâ—Pralaya at the close of the "Age of Brahmâ." These are the three chief *pralayas* or "destruction periods."

There is no room in this short

article for any elaboration of this important fundamental of esoteric philosophy. Readers who look for a detailed account of the processes of Manvantara and Pralaya cannot do better than study the exposition of it by Madame Blavatsky in the main reference given above. Our chief purpose here is to discuss the counterpart of Pralaya in modern Western Science. Before proceeding to this, however, we may well add one more quotation from *The Secret Doctrine* to help us to visualise the Eastern standpoint:—

The appearance and disappearance of the Universe are pictured as an out-breathing and inbreathing of "the Great Breath," which is eternal, and which, being Motion, is one of the three aspects of the Absolute—Abstract Space and Duration being the other two. When the "Great Breath" is projected, it is called the Divine Breath, and is regarded as the breathing of the Unknowable Deity—the One Existence—which breathes out a thought, as it were, which becomes the Kosmos. So also is it when the Divine Breath is inspired again the Universe disappears into the bosom of "the Great Mother," who then sleeps "wrapped in her invisible robes." (I. 43).

What, we now ask, has modern

Western Science to show us in substantiation of the conception of Pralaya? What we may refer to as minor Pralayas are both numerous and obvious—the alternations of light and darkness in day and night, of growth and decay, in the alternations of the Seasons, of the span of human consciousness in the ordinary sense of life and death, and so on. Of planetary pralayas we may cite the example of the moon, once, almost certainly, in the course of its evolution, possessed of both air and water, and therefore presumably capable of supporting life as we know it; but now almost entirely bereft of both, and therefore lifeless. It is a well-known consequence of the now generally accepted kinetic theory of gases that when molecular velocities exceed a certain critical value (easily calculated for each individual planet) in an upwards direction, the molecule in question escapes beyond the gravitational bounds of the planet. It is the continual operation of this factor that gradually thins out a planetary atmosphere in the course of time, and also gradually denudes its evaporated waters. Another principle, that of tidal evolution, has meanwhile also been operating, having as its effect the gradual and inexorable slowing down of the period of the moon's rotation on its axis from what was once but a few hours to the present period of 28 days—in what is referred to as a condition of dynamic equilibrium with the lunar period of revolution about its Mother Earth in the same period of time.

And so the planetary pralaya of the moon is virtually complete.

Nor is it necessary to enter upon the time-honoured controversy of whether or no there is life on the planet Mars to remind the reader that here, too, with its much attenuated atmosphere and the dearth of waters apart from its polar concentrations, we have an intermediate stage of a planetary pralaya in a less advanced form of completion.

But what of the Pralaya Maha—the dissolution of the Universe itself? Has modern Science nothing to show in support of this? Most assuredly it has. Of all laws or principles which modern physics has produced, we may say unhesitatingly that the most unshakable and positive is that which is known as the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The Doctrine of Energy nowadays dominates the whole field of modern physics. Energy has many forms—mechanical, chemical, electrical, heat—and these are all mutually convertible. What is known as the Law of the Conservation of Energy tells us that the sum total of the energy of the Universe is a constant, so that when a given quantity of one form of energy disappears, its exact equivalent in another form appears in its place, the process being one of conversion and not of destruction. It is upon the consequences of this Law that man has improved his power of control to provide, by the agency of suitable machinery, such amenities of life as mechanical transport, electric light and power, and so forth. It is significant, how-

ever, that in all such cases of human control, the basic factor is *fuel*—heat energy derived from chemical energy in one form or another. And yet, of all forms of energy, heat is itself the least useful, and ultimately the most inevitable! All operations of energy conversion are accompanied by a "wastage" or "seepage" of heat energy that becomes dissipated beyond human control. If we carry a current along a wire, some of the electrical energy is wasted in the heating of the wire. In every mechanism of any kind, the working is always accompanied by the production of heat, but for which an equivalent amount of energy would have been available for carrying on the work for which the mechanism was intended. This much energy is therefore "lost" by radiation uselessly into Space. Every known form of energy "pays its toll" in this way. Even when we try to convert heat energy into more useful forms we cannot wholly succeed. Only a small portion of the fuel, for example, that is put into the fire box under a boiler is actually utilised in working the steam engine—the greater portion is lost up the flue and out into space. The Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us that there is only one heat-flow natural to the Universe—that from the higher temperatures to the lower. This process is irreversible. There can never be a flow from the cooler to the hotter. The measure of this flow is known as Entropy.

We see, therefore, that not only are all forms of energy gradually

being permanently converted into heat, but also that the general tendency in the Universe is for the establishing of a uniform temperature throughout. Such irreversible processes as conduction, radiation, friction, etc., are constantly functioning to make the hotter portions of the universe cooler and the colder portions warmer. Gradually the limits of maximum and minimum temperatures are narrowing down, and with this tendency there is less and less heat energy available for "useful conversion". While the total energy of the Universe remains constant, more and more of it is being dissipated into Space as unavailable heat, and gradually the entropy of the Universe is on the increase. So we get the Pralaya Maha—the gradual stagnation of the Universe to a condition of a uniform and a useless heat distribution in a lifeless and a motionless ocean of Space.

Physical research of the last few years has, of course, removed us considerably from the complete simplicity of the "one-way" traffic scheme of heat energy, and while bringing in many respects a clearer picture of its processes, has also brought fresh and for the moment bewildering problems. The problem, for instance, of the mechanism of re-birth following upon the ultimate stagnation which we have indicated is one upon which the modern physicist is silent. Moreover, the newer ideas regarding the electronic structure of the atom have introduced a complication of detail in the process of dissipation to

which we can but make a passing reference. Careful study of stellar evolution shows clearly, for instance, that there must now also be reckoned a radiation of *mass* as well as of heat, since we now know that energy has mass. Moreover, the existence of what have been referred to as "cosmic rays," completely absorbed in the lower

atmospheres, and the subject of contemporary investigation in the great elevations reached recently by Professor Picard and others, may help us to build up a truer picture of the process of the Pralaya Maha in the near future. But at least the Pralaya Maha may now be accepted as a truism of modern cosmical physics.

IVOR B. HART

What we desire to prove is, that underlying every ancient popular religion was the same ancient wisdom-doctrine, one and identical, professed and practised by the initiates of every country, who alone were aware of its existence and importance. To ascertain its origin, and the precise age in which it was matured, is now beyond human possibility. A single glance, however, is enough to assure one that it could not have attained the marvellous perfection in which we find it pictured to us in the relics of the various esoteric systems, except after a succession of ages. A philosophy so profound, a moral code so ennobling, and practical results so conclusive and so uniformly demonstrable is not the growth of a generation, or even a single epoch. Fact must have been piled upon fact, deduction upon deduction, science have begotten science, and myriads of the brightest human intellects have reflected upon the laws of nature, before this ancient doctrine had taken concrete shape. The proofs of this identity of fundamental doctrine in the old religions are found in the prevalence of a system of initiation; in the secret sacerdotal castes who had the guardianship of mystical words of power, and a public display of a phenomenal control over natural forces, indicating association with preterhuman beings. Every approach to the Mysteries of all these nations was guarded with the same jealous care, and in all, the penalty of death was inflicted upon initiates of any degree who divulged the secrets entrusted to them. We have seen that such was the case in the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries, among the Chaldean Magi, and the Egyptian hierophants; while with the Hindus, from whom they were all derived, the same rule has prevailed from time immemorial.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 99.

THE ORIENTALISM OF WHITTIER

[Arthur Christy actively engages himself in investigating the extent of oriental influence on American Men of Letters. In THE ARYAN PATH for June 1933, he wrote on "Whittier and the Brahmo-Samaj" and in September of that year on "Emerson's Oriental Reading". Now he returns to a consideration of Whittier and more generally surveys that poet's spiritual connection with the Orient.—Eds.]

In Romain Rolland's *Prophets of the New India* appear these words:—

It would be a matter of deep interest to know exactly how far the American spirit had been impregnated, directly or indirectly, by the infiltration of Hindu thought during the XIXth century, for there can be no doubt that it has contributed to the strange moral and religious mentality of the modern United States.... I do not know whether any historian will be found to occupy himself seriously with the question. It is nevertheless a psychological problem of the first order, intimately connected with the history of our civilization.

It is in elaboration of the problem Romain Rolland has suggested that I propose to discuss some of the interesting phases of the Orientalism of Whittier. Obviously, there are so many aspects to the study of the rise of Orientalism in America that many weighty tomes must be written before we can hope to see the subject whole. But we can make a beginning, and I know no better way than to examine the works of the poets of the people for evidences of the waning hostility to Orientalism because it was "heathenish". It may be platitudinous, but it is true, that where the poets lead the people follow.

The history of the intellectual and religious contacts of the Orient and America, which still remains

to be written, cannot ignore the Orientalism which appeared in the work of the American literati. It is indeed profitable to study the organized cults and their swami founders, as Wendell Thomas has done in his *Hinduism Invades America*, but these cults are only the culmination of the long process in which the American religious soil has been prepared for Oriental thought. The harrowing was done, I am convinced, largely by poets and travellers through whose pages and tales the public was unconsciously weaned away from the traditional Calvinistic exclusiveness. Consider the assertion in George Willis Cooke's *Unitarianism in America* that it may be accepted as a very interesting fact that "the two potent influences shaping the ancient Puritanism of Salem into Unitarianism were foreign commerce and contact with the Oriental religions". To these we must add the translations of Oriental books which slowly found their way into the new nation, books which in time contributed both figures of speech and essential Oriental thought to some of the classic pages of American literature.

The leavening process was the more effective because it was not

always deliberate. Men often resist organized propaganda, but they are usually in a hospitable mood as they browse through the pages of their favourite poets. When the poet in particular happens to be so devout a soul as Whittier, one realizes that the new Orientalism possessed formidable allies in the writers who were engaged with the eternal verities and read the Eastern scriptures to ascertain the conclusions of the ancients who had wrestled with the same problems. In illustration of a subtle interweaving of Christian and Buddhist morality, consider Whittier's poem "Disarmament" which commences with Christ's command "Put up the sword!" and concludes with echoes of a Buddhist birth-story and the moral injunctions of the *Dhammapada*. After a discussion of the futility and ghastliness of war, Whittier writes of the story told in Eastern tents among Mongol shepherds as they sat around their fires, a story of how

Once, on the errands of his mercy bent,
Buddha, the holy and benevolent,
Met a fell monster, huge and fierce of look
Whose awful voice the hills and forests shook.
"O son of peace!" the giant cried, "thy fate
Is sealed at last, and love shall yield to hate."

Now here was assuredly a new note in the conservative religious poetry of America. Buddha, the founder of a heathen religion, was labelled "holy" and "benevolent," and addressed as a "son of peace". Furthermore, Whittier goes on to inform the reader that

The unarmed Buddha, looking with no trace
Of fear or anger in the monster's face,
In pity said, "Poor fiend, even thee I love."

At these words the sky-tall
monster shrank into the form of a

dove and hovered, singing over the Buddha,

"Hate hath no harm for love," so ran the song;
"And peace unweaponed conquers every
wrong."

A poem such as Whittier's "Disarmament" is decidedly not in the same *genre* as Hunt's "Abou Ben Adhem" or Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra" or Matthew Arnold's "Sohrab and Rustum". In this type will be found either a perfectly good Occidental moral which for the sake of orateness has been put into a pseudo-Oriental form or an interest in the Persian epic form—in this instance the *Shah Nameh*—because of its rhetorical similarities to the epics of Greece. Some of Whittier's poems on the other hand made use of the Oriental scriptures, paraphrasing unique passages and with persuasiveness teaching some of the very lessons which Krishna taught to Arjuna in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Whittier did write poems of the Hunt and Browning type, as witness "The Khan's Devil," "Rabbi Ishmael," "The Two Rabbins," and "Requital". But we may with justice say that these were written in a well-established, conventional form that was not of any particular significance.

Not so, however, such a passage as that which appears in "The Preacher," a long poem written in celebration of George Whitefield, the celebrated religious reformer.

In exposition of the Vedantic doctrine of identity, Whittier writes:—

In the Indian fable Arjoon hears
The scorn of a god rebuke his fears:
"Spare thy pity," Krishna saith;

"Not in thy sword is the power of death!
All is illusion,—loss but seems;
Pleasure and pain are only dreams;
Who deems he slayeth doth not kill;
Who counts as slain is living still.
Strike, nor fear thy blow is crime;
Nothing dies but the cheats of time;
Slain or slayer, small the odds
To each, immortal as Indra's gods."

No readers acquainted with the *Bhagavad-Gita* will fail to recognize in these lines an excellent paraphrase of a passage in the second canto.

But a poem even more interesting because of its Orientalism is "Miriam". Here we find such lines as:—

Those yellow Lamas who at Meerut pray
By wind and water power, and love to say:
"He who forgiveth not shall, unforgiven,
Fail of the rest of Buddha," and who even
Spare the black gnat that stings them....

And there are lines in the conclusion of the poem which are even more significant, for they obviously contain Whittier's paraphrase of the typical conclusions of representative cantos of the *Gita*. The words are placed in the mouth of an ancient holy man who

Knew Manu's laws, and through his close-
shut eyes
Saw things far off, and as an open book
Into the thoughts of other men could look,
Began, half chant, half howling, to rehearse
The fragment of a holy Vedic verse;
And thus it ran: "He who all things
forgives
Conquers himself and all things else, and
lives

Above the reach of wrong or hate or fear,
Calm as the gods, to whom he is most
dear."

Assuredly here is not a presentation of Oriental teaching in a manner designed to estrange the Christian reader. Here we have an echo of the best of the *Gita* with fitness woven into a poem on a very Christian theme. The reason Whittier wrote as he did is simply explained. He believed firmly that there were truths in the ancient scriptures of all races which

The wiser world hath not outgrown,
And the All-Father is our own!

I do not have at my disposal the space that would permit reference to all instances in which Whittier made use of the Oriental scriptures or alluded to doctrines and events. Nor can I attempt to distinguish between the Brahman, Mohammedan and Confucian echoes in his works. What I have offered will be sufficient if it leads to a fresh perusal of Whittier's pages with an eye to discerning the catholicity of his sympathies and the variety of his interests. His pages offer a rich suggestion of the slow processes of intellectual and spiritual osmosis through which Orientalism has permeated the American temper.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE SELF OF MATTER AND THE SELF OF SPIRIT*

[C. E. M. Joad reviews two volumes of philosophical studies by Indian scholars and although he disagrees with their conclusions, he admires the powerful reasoning by which they are supported.—EDS.]

Mr. Kaveeshwar has written a scholarly study of Berkeley's Metaphysics. The exposition is clear, the treatment sympathetic, the criticisms acute, and the general thesis, that Berkeley, while arriving on the whole at the right conclusions, namely, those of Spiritual Idealism, tends to defend them with unsound arguments, is one that will commend itself to Indian philosophers. Two points may be selected for comment. First, why did Mr. Kaveeshwar choose Berkeley for his subject? Because, primarily, he was struck by the similarity of many of his doctrines to those of the Vidyanavadin Baudhas; and struck further by the similarity between some of the criticisms levelled against Berkeley's doctrines, in so far as they assert a purely subjective Mentalism by the later objective Idealists in Europe and the criticisms brought against the Vidyanavadin Baudhas by Shankaracharya. One of the merits of the book is, indeed, the frequent parallels which the author draws between the doctrines of metaphysicians belonging to different civilizations separated in space by half the globe and in time by centuries.

Secondly, Mr. Kaveeshwar devotes considerable attention to

Berkeley's doctrine of the immortality of the soul. He expresses himself as being in general agreement with the common criticism of this doctrine that the soul or self, as ordinarily conceived, is so closely interlocked with the body that it is difficult to see in what sense it could, if disembodied, be considered to be the *same* self. He quotes, for example, with apparent approval, Professor Taylor's criticism "unless the soul continued to live for aims and interests teleologically continuous with those of its earthly life, there would be no genuine extension of our selfhood beyond the grave". Berkeley's mistake, he thinks, arises from his failure to distinguish between the empirical self of our ordinary experience and our real self, the Atman, which underlies it. The second is immortal, the first is not. But if in ordinary experience I am not aware of my Atman—and Mr. Kaveeshwar seems to suggest that I am not—it is a little difficult to see how the doctrine of *my* immortality is supported. It may, of course, be a fact that some self other than the self of which I am empirically aware survives; but it is not clear why the fact, if it is a fact, should interest me.

**The Metaphysics of Berkeley*. By G. W. Kaveeshwar. Published by Mrs. Kaveeshwar. 5s. 6d.
Ajñāna. By G. R. Malkani, R. Das, and T. R. V. Murti. (Luzac and Co., London.)

The concept of the dual self may serve as a link between the *Metaphysics of Berkeley* and *Ajñāna*. The latter is a treatise on the nature of ignorance, or, as we in the West would call it, error, by three profound and subtle thinkers, who are apparently on the staff of the Indian Institute of Philosophy. Although each contribution is independent of the others, the three form in fact a series of parallel statements of what is essentially the same position, that of the Advaita Vedanta. Let me say at once that *Ajñāna* is of the highest philosophical interest and that the three contributors exhibit a philosophical acumen and dialectical skill which, if they are at all representatives of modern Indian philosophical writings, only increase the Western reader's surprise on reading Mr. Kaveeshwar's complaint that "it is very easily possible for an Indian student to qualify himself for the M. A. degree in the subject of philosophy . . . from an Indian university, without having any considerable—and in some cases even the least—knowledge of *Indian philosophy*." It is not merely the fact that Indian philosophy is in certain respects unique; it is also the manifestly high attainments of some modern Indian philosophers which raise this surprise to the point of something like astonishment.

What is the problem of error? I will begin briefly stating it in my own way. Either the mind in knowing discovers objects existing independently of itself, or it creates

them for itself, or it partly does one and partly the other. If the first, then error is impossible, since we can only know what is; if the second, we never know anything that anybody else knows, and we are forced back upon Berkeley's subjectivism, since our minds are shut up each within the closed circle of its own ideas; if the third, how are we to distinguish the one activity that of discovery from the other that of creation? How, in fact, can we ever be sure that we are knowing anything which is independent of us and is not merely the projected fancy of our own minds? The writers of *Ajñāna*, if pressed, would no doubt choose the second of these three alternatives, yet would so define the mind, or rather the self, as to rob it of its subjectivist implications.

Mr. Malkani states the problem somewhat differently. Reality, he holds, is a single, non-temporal, non-substantial spiritual unity; it is an Absolute, "eternally accomplished," eternally existing. The individual is himself in his inmost being this Absolute. Now the world, as it appears, is a collection of temporal, material objects, extended in space and of apparently individual minds which perceive them; this appearance must, if reality is a spiritual unity, be illusory. Hence the concept of Avidya (apparently used synonymously with *Ajñāna*) denoting the misperception of things, the perception of them, that is to say, not as they are, but as they are not! Avidya, then, is a form of knowing, not the

world of appearance which is known. (This, at least, is Mr. Malkani's rendering of the meaning of the term; Mr. Das seems to take a different view, defining *Ajñāna* as "the material cause, the stuff of which illusions are made," which suggests the illusory world of appearance rather than the misperception of it by the mind.) Mr. Malkani is anxious to disclaim the view that Avidya creates the illusory appearance it perceives. Rather it implies and is implied by it—"the being of Avidya and the being of the world are mutually implied and partake of the same sort of reality."

Mr. Malkani's argument proceeds along the familiar lines of Idealist philosophy. Reasons are first adduced for supposing that matter cannot be real; it is full of contradictions. Nor, he holds, does the modern realist's theory that the contents of the external world are not substantial physical objects but sense data, patches of colour, raps of sound, and so forth, avail to meet the objections urged against substantial matter. What follows? First, "we misperceive the real when we perceive it as something extended in space and time and as determined by the law of causality." Secondly, if it has no reality in its own right, matter must be either a creation of spirit, or it must be spirit misperceived or misapprehended. The second alternative, which Mr. Malkani adopts, brings us back to the problem of the soul or self. There are, he holds, at least two souls or selves—the empirical self known to

us in consciousness and the Atman which is behind and beyond consciousness. "There is nothing" behind or beyond the true self "that can know it or make it an object. It is therefore not related to objects at all; it is, in fact, pure subject." In short, and not to put too fine a point on it, it is the spiritual Absolute which is the sole real. What, then, of *Ajñāna*, of Avidya? It is an activity of the empirical self only and as such it is not truly real. In reality itself there is no error. In the "Absolute Reality which is our true Self, the whole realm of the objective, and also that ignorance which may in a sense be said to be the cause of the appearance of the latter are cancelled."

My inability to subscribe to any of these conclusions does not detract from my admiration of the exceedingly powerful reasoning by which they are supported. Nor, because space has prevented me from dealing with the contributions of Mr. Das and Mr. Murti, should it be inferred that their interest is inferior to that of Mr. Malkani. All three, indeed, are models of what Idealist philosophical writing should be. But, although it permits me to admire, my disagreement obliges me to protest. A proper protest would take a volume; but, since error is the ostensible object of enquiry, let me enter a caveat against the notion that, if Monism is to be preserved, error can, as Mr. Malkani contends, be unreal. For consider; I certainly believe the world to be a plurality of many things. If the world is

as these writers maintain, a spiritual unity, my belief must be erroneous. Is the error I make in so misconceiving the world a real error or not? If it is real, then error belongs to reality, and the universe cannot be a unity through and through, unless, indeed, it be one single, coherent error. If it is

unreal, then it is not really a mistake to hold that the world is a plurality of many things. But if it is not, then Idealist Monism which maintains that it is, must be false. In a word I do not see how, if Idealist Monism is to be maintained, error can be unreal.

C. E. M. JOAD

DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT*

[Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, M.A., Ph. D., is a Sanskrit Scholar of distinction and Secretary of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. He has contributed to the Harvard Oriental Series, a critical edition of *Rama's Later History* (Uttara-Rama-Charita) an ancient Sanskrit drama by Bhavabhuti, and has also to his credit numerous other volumes. In collaboration with Professor R. D. Ranade, he is working on a *History of Indian Philosophy*, of which the seventh volume was reviewed by Hugh I'A. Fausset in our issue of November, 1933.—EDS.]

The present publication belongs to the "The History of Civilisation" Series, in which is included *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History* by the same author, published in 1927, of which the volume under review is a continuation and a complement. Since, however, each of the two volumes is designed to be more or less self-sufficient, there has been some inevitable repetition and overlapping. This book deals more fully with the philosophical and religious aspects of Buddhism, while the earlier one stressed the legendary, biographical and historical aspects. Both the volumes contain illustrations, a detailed account of the Buddhist Scriptures (by way of an Appendix), a serviceable Bibliography, and a full Index.

There can be no question that Dr. Thomas is perfectly at home with his subject. He has used most of his sources in the original, and on any point of consequence such as the birth or the death of the Buddha, his Temptations, his First Sermon, his views on Nirvāna, or the interpretation of

the so-called Chain of Twelve Causes, the author is able to cite almost exhaustively a mass of authorities ancient and modern, Indian as well as European, with a facility truly remarkable. The result has been somewhat unfortunate to the general reader, who, if he comes to these volumes with any clear-cut ideas about the biography and personality of the Buddha or with any specific views on his teaching, is sure, after a perusal of these volumes, to get his ideas blurred and his earlier beliefs rather unceremoniously shaken; and this, in our opinion, constitutes at once the strength as well as the weakness of our author. In other words, these volumes deserve to become standard works of reference for scholars who may wish to find out the documentary evidence and the critical literature bearing upon a particular topic relating to Buddhism, but may repel the beginners who may wish to win light and inspiration from a study of the Founder of one of the greatest of World Religions.

As Buddhism arose in a region and

* *The History of Buddhist Thought*. By EDWARD J. THOMAS, M. A., D. Litt. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 15s.)

amongst a people not directly under the influence of Brahmanic culture, religion and philosophy, we are not surprised to find misrepresentations of these in Buddhist works, as when they talk in season and out of season of Brahmā (masculine) "the Creator" and remain unaccountably silent about Brahman (neuter) and all that the Upanishadic philosophy of the Absolute implies. We can perhaps understand and allow this in the case of the Founder, but were not the later exegetes and compilers of the Canon expected to know better? And if, nevertheless, they allowed the words and arguments to remain as we find them to-day, should not this indicate on their part a greater measure of fidelity to the original tradition than the author seems generally to concede to these later compilations? The compilers may and do differ amongst themselves on other points where questions of immediate doctrinal importance were involved. These differences the author has fully emphasised. But it is worth while emphasising their agreements also, as there we can feel as though we are treading on surer ground.

Dr. Thomas has done well in bringing prominently to the fore the "Ascetic Ideal" implied in Buddhism and the consequent part that "Yogic" practices played in shaping the course of conduct and the conception of the Nirvānic goal promulgated by it. And as there was an equal emphasis placed by the Founder upon moral discipline and self-culture as the necessary propaedeutic to it, both for the lay disciple and the avowed monk, Buddhism is saved, as the author correctly points out, from the charge of being a mere "vulgar magic and thaumaturgy coupled with hypnotic practices". Nevertheless the actual contribution made by Early Buddhism to Ontology or Metaphysics seems to be disappointingly meagre. When cornered, "The Enlightened One" gives non-committal answers and withal resents being dub-

bed Agnostic or Nihilist. The position thus taken does not seem to us to differ in any essential respects from the position of Yājñavalkya in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka: "When, however, for him everything has become just the Self, with what means—and what—could he see?"—a position which is even more logically contained in *Guroś tu maunam vyākhyānam*. The frankly agnostic attitude of Sañjaya, Bellatthi-putta, which the Jain doctrine of the Syādvāda sought to invest with an apparently positive aspect, falls quite in a line with the above attitudes, and one is naturally led to ask whether these more or less cognate attitudes to Reality could not have been the inevitable reactions against the disturbing "Sophistic" dialectics of the great "Heretic" teachers preceding both Jainism and Buddhism. That the so-called Akriyā-vāda, Svabhāva-vāda, Bhūta-vāda, and the other view-points of this heretical philosophy were actually held and preached in the Post-Upanishadic and Pre-Buddhistic period may well be believed in. Not only the Jain and Buddhist sources, but even Brahmanic sources—the Upanishads and the Mahābhārata—vouch for their existence. Dr. Thomas seems to us to be unnecessarily sceptical on this point. Compare Dr. F. Otto Schrader's *Über den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvirā's und Buddha's*, Strassburg, 1902.

We confess to a few other minor differences of opinion—mainly of emphasis—with the author. But the sterling merit of the work remains unquestioned. To books on Buddhism there is no end. But we must frankly admit that we have not so far come across any other book of this compass, packed full of reliable information and calculated to afford a clear perspective of the origin and evolution of Buddhist thought in all its aspects. We congratulate Dr. Thomas on his achievement and unhesitatingly recommend the book to every serious student of Indian Philosophy.

S. K. BELVALKAR

A MODERN YOGA*

[Sri Krishnaprem comes from a cultured and well-to-do English family. His original name was Ronald Nixon. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences. A brilliant and deep student of philosophy, it was with him a case of love at first sight with the Vedanta which made him adopt India as his spiritual home. He came first as a Professor of English at the Lucknow University, but gave up this very highly-paid and much-coveted post for a Professorship at the Hindu University on a small salary, because Benares attracted him deeply. Later he gave up that post also, and gave away all his savings and belongings, to resort to Almora, a poor Vaishnava. He is now at a small Asram in the Himalayas under the guruship of Sri Mataji, a Brahmana lady who retired from the active duties of life and who is a devotee of Sri Krishna. It was there that Ronald Nixon changed his name.—Eds.]

A new work from the pen of Sri Aurobindo is an event. The present volume is a collection of writings dealing with problems and difficulties raised for the most part by some of those who are aspiring to lead the spiritual life under his guidance and consequently has for sādhakas an even greater interest than works addressed primarily to an outside public.

To avoid possible misunderstandings it is perhaps as well to say that the yoga treated in this book has nothing in common with the so-called "yoga" which, I am told, is having quite a vogue in the sillier circles of the West and which concerns itself with such things as standing on one's head and breathing rhythmically, psychic trivialities or ridiculous "concentration" on health, wealth and happiness. It deals with the high spiritual quest that even so long ago as the time of Yājñavalkya, was *anuh panthā vitatah puranō*—"the ancient narrow Path that stretches far away."

There is perhaps no one writing in India whose words on this subject will be listened to with more respect than Sri Aurobindo, and that for two very good reasons: first, his powerful and keen intellect, and secondly his prolonged and arduous *sādhana*, a *sādhana* which, I understand, he is still pursuing. This book, moreover, is clearly based on the author's own experience.

It may be briefly stated that the

central method of this yoga is an integral and comprehensive offering of the whole nature to the Divine Reality. The technical methods of the classic yogas are not rejected but are all subordinated to this central "*samarpan*" which is, as it were, their soul and must include our whole being, physical, emotional, mental and spiritual. There is to be no ascetic dualism but an ascent which springs from the whole nature. Rejecting the selfish desire to "live one's own life," the aspirant bends all his powers, purified by the discipline of yoga, to a winged ascent to the one Divine Reality and to a poised waiting at the feet of that Reality.

At this point, the point at which many mystics stop, the second movement of this yoga commences. The sādhaka, emptied of self but filled with the Light and Power of the Divine according to the level to which he has been able to rise, now seeks to retrace his steps and to descend again to the lower world bringing down with him as much as he can hold of the Light and Power with which he has been filled, thus transforming his lower nature and ultimately making of it a centre in this lower world through which can take place the manifestation of a diviner reality than has heretofore been possible. Thus there is a twofold movement; an ascent to the Divine and a descent *with* the Divine; an ascent to the "kingdom of Heaven" and a

(Arya Publishing House, Calcutta. Rs. 2.)

building of that kingdom of Heaven here on this earth; no mere shaking off of the dust of this world in "a flight of the Alone to the Alone," but an attempt to transmute, to divinise life here by providing channels and centres of manifestation for that spiritual Reality which is, even now, the very basis of this and all other worlds but is hampered and clogged in expression by the "*tamasic*" inertness of the world of matter and the inharmonious self-seeking of the world of mind.

This, and nothing less than this, is the aim of this yoga. Soul, mind and body, all must be transmuted. The soul must no longer remain a pale starved shadow but must become a vivid and radiant existence, a centre pulsating with Divine Light and energy, dominating and using the mind and body. The mind, too, must no longer remain a mere analytic machine, revelling in its proud independence. Instead it must realise its subordination to the soul and assume its proper function, that of the formative power, that which impresses with form, not merely the raw material of the world but also the formless (in the sense of transcending form) truth of the soul. Even the body, the "despised and rejected" of so many mystics, must become a harmonious vehicle of the Divine Life in the same way that a block of marble from being a lump of dead matter becomes a radiant expression of the sculptor's idea. It is no narrow or unworthy ideal, no mere salvation-seeking, but a noble attempt to "remould things nearer to—not the heart's—but the Divine desire," and it is one which should commend itself to the attention of all whose eyes are not utterly blinded by the follies of materialism.

Nor need the so-called "intellectual" turn up his nose in scorn. Here is no pseudo-science, no obsolete psychology, no fantastic cosmology. Though I, at least, am in no way prepared to admit that the old systems represent merely "the childish lisings of humanity" or whatever the silly phrase was, yet it must be admitted that they have long

ceased to be understood by the majority, including many of their orthodox commentators who manage sometimes to shed more darkness upon light than light upon darkness. In this system a new terminology has been forged, which is more easily intelligible to the mind trained in modern ways of thought. It might be suggested that the value of a second edition would be greatly enhanced if an appendix were added giving explanatory accounts of some of the more important technical terms such as "vital," "psychic," "supermind" and others which are all used in a highly technical sense which has to be gathered from somewhat inadequate data as the book proceeds.

One outstanding feature of the book is its clear differentiation between the spiritual experience of yoga and the merely intellectual concepts of idealistic philosophy or the emotional intuitions of poetry. The intuitions of the poet, shot through as they sometimes are with spiritual light, are too vague and evanescent to be of practical use. They are like the delicate plants that branch out in beautiful shapes beneath the surface of a lake but which collapse into a sloppy shapeless mass when you take them out of the water for examination.

It is characteristic of this age of popular education that many people suppose that anything can be learnt by a patient study of books. But there are some things which can never be learnt in this manner, and yoga (in any form) is one of them. Yoga is the art of the soul and it can never be learnt without the living contact with a master. All attempts to practise yoga without a Guru, and a real Guru at that, end either in disappointed failure, trivial psychism, ill-health or madness. The present writer has seen with his own eyes cases of all the above occurring to uninstructed or ill-instructed would-be yogis.

Some of the dangers and difficulties on the path are discussed in the chapter on "The Intermediate Zone". Its perusal will enable the reader to under-

* *The Riddle of this World* by SRI AUROBINDO (Arya Publishing House, Calcutta. Rs. 2.)
Obtainable at the Shama'a Bookshop, Medows Street, Fort, Bombay.)

stand how it is that there are so many "Avatars" and "Jivanmuktas" roaming about the world nowadays and so many prophets with "divine inspiration" seeking to save our souls though their own seem to the outer eye as much in need of salvation as ours. The prevalence of such people, by no means *all* charlatans, is often a ground of scepticism to the superficial, but it is, in reality, an inevitable phenomenon, always liable to occur to those who essay the mystic path without adequate guidance. In this sphere, as in others, Sri Aurobindo gives us advice which is clear and definite, that is to say, as definite as could be expected in a realm which he well describes as one of "half-lights and tempting, but often mixed and misleading experiences".

In fact, all through, the book is characterised by the clear definiteness of thought that real experience gives. Many have got into the way of supposing that the word "mystical" is synonymous with the word "vague," and that all spiritual writings will have an elusive dreamy texture, a sort of Celtic twilight which conceals more than it reveals, and, though rich in the suggestion of infinite possibilities, is apt to be poor in definite content and disappointing in realisation. Such readers will find that the life of the spirit can be written about with a concrete clarity which will surprise them, a clarity of thought and expression which, while it too often crystallises into sterile dogmas at the hands of subsequent generations, is yet clearly visible in the writings of many of the great mystics.

The concluding section of the book contains a gallant attempt to give some explanation of the origin of the cosmos which, if it cannot be the whole truth, will yet serve as some sort of a prop to those whose minds cannot stand alone but demand some answer at least to the great question as to why this cosmic process with all its misery emerged from out the blissful splendour which lies beyond the flaming ramparts of the world.

Let us, however, turn away from the

contemplation of the ultimate insolubility back to the yoga which, with its double movement, stands before us like a challenge. Are we going to remain in our own selfish littlenesses, forever chasing the tail of our own desires, or are we going to lose our selves that we may find them again in selfless co-operation with the one Divine Reality which rules us all, mystic and materialist alike?

A great and sympathetic Western writer has described Sri Aurobindo as believing that "humanity is going to enlarge its domain by the acquisition of a new knowledge, new powers, new capacities which will lead to as great a revolution in human life as did the physical science in the nineteenth century". Now this seems to me a misrepresentation of the true yoga, as dangerous as it is slight. Yoga is not something to increase the vital well-being and cultural development of humanity as such, something like eugenics or the wireless. Any view that places the emphasis on a mere humanity is then clearly wrong, for it is the service of the Divine Reality and its manifestation in humanity and elsewhere that is the heart of the yoga and this difference, slight or purely verbal as it may seem to humanist moderns, is yet of profound significance and makes all the difference between the high spiritual endeavour of the ancient East and the ephemeral humanist progress of the modern West. Not that such "progress" is in any way to be deprecated in itself, but it is a phenomenon belonging to a far lower level than this or any other yoga.

I have one slight criticism, that Sri Aurobindo does something less than justice to Buddhist yoga. It appears to be considered that Buddhism taught world-negation and escape into a transcendental region beyond the cosmic process. No doubt this is true of certain Buddhist schools, but it is by no means true of all. The extremely influential *Mahayana* schools, or some at least of them, taught the nobler *Bodhisattva* doctrine and, rejecting what they termed "the *Nirvana* of the *Arhata*" held that supreme enlighten-

ment consisted in the realisation that *Nirvana* and *Samsara* are one and the same reality which they termed "bhutathata". Ashvaghosha, perhaps the greatest of all Buddhist philosophers, expressly teaches that enlightenment has two aspects which he terms "prajna" and "achintya karma". The first may be regarded as the centripetal force leading to realisation of the Unity and the latter a centrifugal force working for the spiritual welfare of all beings. I do not propose to discuss here the question as to how far this doctrine is equivalent to the "double movement" of Sri Aurobindo's yoga but it must, I think, certainly be admitted that the escape from the cosmic process by no means constituted the sole message of Buddhism.

To return to the yoga, it may be of interest to enumerate the qualifications which are necessary for one who aspires to tread this path. From a study of the book it becomes clear that they do not differ essentially from those demanded by the masters of old. "A central sincerity," "a fundamental humility," the ability to do all work in "a spirit of acceptance, discipline and surrender, not with personal demands and conditions but with a vigilant conscious submission to control and guidance," a calm equanimity and a faith that "in spite of our errors and weaknesses and in spite of any immediate appearance of failure, the Divine Will is leading us, through every circumstance, towards the final Realisation". Above all, transmuting all by its constant presence, must be a burning aspiration towards the Divine and a desire to offer oneself and all that one has for the Divine service quite irrespective of what part one may be called upon to play in the Divine LILA.

Clearly, the yoga is no passing amusement for those in search of a new sensation. It is the age-old spiritual path, the "Great Work" of the alchemists, the transmutation of the whole character, and this can never be an easy task, for although the actual transmutation is and can only be accomplished by the Divine Grace, yet the preliminary drudgery, the preparing of the vessel for that Grace must be accomplished by one's own efforts.

Perhaps there will be some whose first question will be whether this yoga is a *jnana* yoga, a *bhakti* yoga or a *karma* yoga. I will leave such lovers of classification to find out the answer from the book itself or from the following few remarks. Here is knowledge, the knowledge that there is nothing but the One Divine Reality, the "sarvam khalvidam Brahma," of the Upanishads: here is *bhakti* for it sets forth the necessity for unchanging love of and self-surrender to the Lord, the *atmanivedana* which is the culminating stage of the nine-fold *bhakti* of the *Srimad Bhagavat*: and here is *karma* for it expounds the unattached skill in action, the "*karmasu kaushalam*" of the *Gita*.

Beyond all classifications stands the One, the Supreme, the Stainless Eternal, changeless amidst His own eternal change, effulgent amidst His own dark shadows. All paths are His paths and this book stands as one more testimony that, even in this age of dark materialism, the ancient, razor-edged Path is open for those who have the courage to walk therein: "tena dheera apiyanti Brahavidah swargam lokamita urdhwam vimuktah"—"Thereby the calm wise who know the Brahman, released, come unto the high Heaven world beyond."

SRI KRISHNAPREM

WAR*

[Henry Pratt Fairchild is the Professor of Sociology in New York University; here he analyses the different programmes offered for war-prevention, and finds them wanting.—EDS.]

The title of this book was apparently chosen more for its popular appeal than because of its applicability to the nature and subject matter of the treatise itself. A more apt title would have been "The Political Expert's Analysis of the Present Obstacles to Peace". If the reviewer is justified in his assumption that the "intelligent man" referred to is just the ordinary layman with an average I. Q., who can be reasonably identified with himself, then he is forced to say bluntly that, except for the last chapter—Harold Laski's contribution,—he finds very little in this volume in the way of suggestion, as to what he can do, or what he can urge others to do, that will really be effective in preventing future wars.

To begin with, the book is much too long for such a layman, too detailed, too crowded with minute historical data and abstract analyses of technical factors, forces, and relationships. All that the average intelligent man is able to grasp, or needs to know, about these matters could have been condensed into a quarter of the total number of pages (564). On the other hand, there are enormous gaps and deficiencies with respect to fundamental matters about which the intelligent man needs and craves information and understanding—but more of this later.

Except for the aforementioned last chapter, the book is essentially a brief for the League of Nations as the one outstanding hope for the elimination of the international anarchy that Norman Angell so well portrays in his first chapter. Coming at a time when the League has recently suffered several severe body blows with a resulting decline in prestige, this elaborate defence, with its suggestions for improvement, is salutary and welcome. Cer-

tainly nothing else has yet been offered that could take the place of the League, with all its weaknesses and deficiencies. But the treatment of the subject in this book is too largely re-threshing of old straw to give the intelligent man much inspiration or enlightenment. Gilbert Murray's demonstration that the Treaty of Versailles is not the towering obstacle to peace that many liberals think it is, is interesting and useful. But to take eighty-seven pages in proving that a certain treaty is not seriously impeding peace is a distinctly negative way of helping the intelligent man to know what to do to prevent a war that is actually impending. If we can't stop war by revising the Treaty, what can we do?

Much the same can be said of C. M. Lloyd's chapter on the "Problem of Russia" and Charles Roden Buxton's on "Inter-Continental Peace". There is much that is anachronistic, in particular, in the discussion of Russia in the light of recent events. Viscount Cecil's discussion of "The League as a Road to Peace" is the kind of a closely reasoned, well-informed, comprehensive production that one would expect from that source. But the pallidness of its tone may be judged by the closing paragraph:—

Finally it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the Prevention of War is not simply a negative business, a repressive action to be taken in a crisis. The best and surest of all "sanctions" against war lies in making the ties of peace too strong to break. We can all help to do that. When the advantages of peaceful co-operation are seen to be so great that no State will dare to throw them away, and when the individual citizens, the unofficial organisations, and the Governments are firmly resolved to withhold those advantages from a violator of the minimum code of peace, then the prevention of war will be assured.

What is the intelligent man to do

* *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*. Edited by LEONARD WOOLF. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 5s.)

about all that? Of the same general character is W. Arnold Foster's long chapter on "Arbitration, Security, Disarmament".

What this book lacks is fresh viewpoints, original approaches, searching analyses of factors seldom recognized, and practical suggestions as to what the lay individual can actually do. The reviewer does not claim to have read every word of the volume, and consequently he is under some restraint in specifying matters that it does not contain. But certainly there are enormous deficiencies. When practically all students who approach international relations from the sociological point of view agree that overpopulation is one of the greatest causes of international war, if not actually the dominating one, why is not an extensive treatment of this subject included in this book? True, Norman Angell touches upon the theme very briefly (page 485), but dismisses it with the apparent assumption that better co-operation is all that is needed to correct overpopulation—a most disheartening finger-snapping at the established body of population theory.

And how much the book would have gained by a really searching inquiry into the nature of group loyalty, the essence of nationality, the derivation of the actual forces that drive peoples into armed conflict with each other! The probing into the causes of war scarcely scratches the surface, and how can the intelligent man know what to do about war if he does not understand the real causes? And why, oh why, is there no really objective, vigorous, discussion of the future of the League, and the changes that might be made in it which would add to its strength and effectiveness? For example, Norman Angell points out the discrepancy between the order of the individual state that possesses a police force and the anarchy of the international association that has no such agency. But instead of following the argument to its logical conclusion, and looking the need of an inter-

national police force squarely in the face, he shies off and says:—

This must not be taken as an implied argument in favour of a centrally organized police force for the world, an international army. (p. 47).

Why not? What reason is there to suppose that sixty-odd nations, with widely divergent languages, traditions, standards, and modes can devise a basis for permanent peace without the use of an instrument which every separate nation on earth, however homogeneous it may be, has found indispensable? To say that the very diversity makes it difficult is no answer. The intelligent man is interested in knowing what is the logical and the effective thing to do. If the necessary thing is made impossible by various contributory factors, then there is nothing to do but to resign himself to recurrent wars until the nations have been brought to the point of facing the inevitable. Dismissing necessity because of difficulty gets one nowhere.

There remains, then, Harold Laski's plea for the abandonment of individualistic capitalism, and the establishment of a communalized form of social organization all over the civilized globe. This is courageous, reasonable, inspiring, and convincing. This is something that would bring many desirable results, aside from the prevention of war. It is doubtful if it would prevent war, as long as nationalism, group feeling, and ethnic egoism persist. The assumption that all international war is the result of capitalistic activity is by no means proved. Commercial rivalry may be one important cause of war, but it is by no means the only one. And in many respects, Laski's treatment is quite inconsistent with the rest of the book, which assumes that the League of Nations is to continue to be as association of capitalist states (p. 195).

And so the intelligent man is left still groping in the dark, with no discernible pathway leading to the shining haven of peace.

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

Coleridge: Select Poetry and Prose.
Edited by STEPHEN POTTER. (Nonesuch Press, London. 8s. 6d.)

Like Ruskin, Coleridge would at intervals write a volume consisting of the titles of works he was about to write. He was fond of referring to "his system"—the great philosophical work he never produced. He never found a suitable Form in which to present all his priceless talents to the world. Yet after a hundred years that Form has been found. Mr. Stephen Potter has taken the fragments from all their different nooks, from the *Biographia Literaria*, the *Aids to Reflection*, the *Notebooks*, the *Table Talk*, the *Theological and Metaphysical Discussions*, the *Political Journalism*, gathered them together selectively into one splendid volume—and, suddenly! Coleridge emerges in a *perfect form*. The element of surprise, of joy, as we come unexpectedly upon gems of wisdom, eloquence, and mysticism, as we miraculously pluck the pearls from their hiding place, could not be achieved in any other form. It strikes me as a noble piece of work.

Mr. Potter's selection from the poetry is also happy. Coleridge excelled in Fancy when he wanted to excel in Imagination. But the famous poem "Kubla Khan" belongs to no category. Does this dream-poem mean anything? On the face of it, nothing. And yet its very phraseology invites the assistance of Freud. Mme. Blavatsky draws attention to the possibilities in an *Essay on Dreams*, and we wish that she had followed it up.

I could quote from this volume sixty paragraphs of immediate relevance to readers of THE ARYAN PATH—for Coleridge belongs to our era. I choose two:—

(1) I have known some who have been *rational*ly educated, as it is styled. They were marked by a microscopic acuteness, but when they looked at great things, all became blank, and they saw nothing, and denied (very illogically) that anything could be seen, and uni-

formly put the negation of a power for the possession of a power, and called the want of imagination judgment, and the never being moved to rapture philosophy!

(2) What is it that I employ my metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts? To extinguish the light of love and conscience, to make myself and others *worthless, soulless, godless*? No, to expose the folly and legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed organ of language, to support all old and venerable truths, to support, to kindle, to project, to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings suffuse vital warmth through our reason—these are my objects and these my subjects.

Those two quotations are sufficient to show why it was that Coleridge wished to make it his chief task to establish the distinction between Reason and Understanding, with their relatives Imagination and Fancy. Such a distinction is by no means as difficult for us as it was a hundred years ago. It is the now familiar distinction between unintellectual and intellectual knowledge, between cerebration and intuition, between arguing and seeing, between reflecting and contemplating. Wordsworth called Imagination "Reason in her most exalted mood." Whether we use the term Reason or Imagination we mean an inward beholding, a direct aspect of truth. Fancy, on the other hand, the decorative play of the Understanding, is but the clothing of faery-like imaginings with reality instead of quickening our sight of the Real with the powers of the imagination. If we grasp these distinctions we shall easily understand Coleridge's worship of Wordsworth. For Wordsworth possessed the natural faculty for demonstrating in poetry this function of Reason and Imagination, while Coleridge himself, by some strange irony, possessed a natural faculty for employing Fancy, with the result that this superb philosopher and metaphysician is chiefly known as the author of *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel*!

J. S. COLLIS

The Christian Renaissance. By G. WILSON KNIGHT. (Macmillan & Co., London. 12s. 6d.)

This is a book of deep interest. It is tributary to that strong current which now is carrying away the mind of thoughtful men from the abstract and mechanical towards the concrete and the vital. As Dr. Whitehead calls for a New Reformation, so Professor Knight announces a New Renaissance in harmony with the dynamic truth of the New Testament. He wishes to see a Christianity which can live in union with Renaissance science (that he believes is already without difficulty) and in union also with the *life-consciousness* of the Renaissance, that delightful sense of a great expansion of heart and mind and action which is seen in Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe and others of the Renaissance poets. His key-thought is of the creative marriage between soul and body, heaven and earth. Nature with its love and joy and beauty can and must be given its true place in religion. Christianity has too often been dark and threatening. "We are still afraid of Jehovah, forgetting the Christ." But to Dante, whatever mediæval glooms beset his poetry, Paradise meant love and joy and beauty and dance and banquet and laughter. So Jesus "would have us blend our life with the life around us, incarnate our instincts along the creative rhythms of nature". He would have us live our metaphors, as in that Incarnation whereby the divine Logos is married to humanity.

Professor Knight tells us that his vision of the Christian Renaissance arose from his experience in the interpretation of Shakespeare. By studying the Bible or Shakespeare or Dante or Goethe "we raise our understanding beyond the complexities of history and literature . . . to Life itself". Poetry and vision have been failing us for a long time. Fact and value, nature and spirit have fallen apart. But we may look for a "richer integration" than anything in the past, "childlike but not childish, incorporating in some

way the purest poetry with a keen critical and historical faculty".

Space does not allow us to follow the author in his enthusiastic appreciation of Jesus as the greatest of poets, a poet supreme in word—and in life: or of Paul as he writes of the new Life that has come to birth. The New Testament he describes as brimming over with life, a life victorious over death. Here if anywhere poetry has been put to the high use of bringing light and joy to men, of creating a new life-consciousness in harmony with the divine. Paul, for example, does not set out to write poetry, but he writes it. His conscious aim is to convince and convert and to organise the new life-forces, but his faith in the living Christ drives him to write "from an imaginative, not from an intellectual centre".

The author, earnest in his ethical sincerity, seeks, as the mere moralist never seeks, to lift us above morality to the love and life which is the source of true morality. He finds the poets one with him there. "Consider how our Renaissance poets stress union and love and an awakened life: a death-conquest, a freedom from evil: all this is close to Christian doctrine," and indeed "many of our great and so-called pagan poets became specifically Christian in their latest work". The Renaissance, that splendid re-birth, "failed to integrate the new poetry with Christianity. That integration awaits us to-day."

G. E. NEWSOM

[Very likely the above review was the very last piece of writing that the Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge did. We regret to chronicle his death which occurred on February 15th. He was the author of *The New Morality*, which was reviewed in the pages of our April 1933 number. His last letter to us, enclosing his notice of *The Christian Renaissance* was dated February 2nd, and, as always, was friendly and full of good weal towards the work of THE ARYAN PATH. Though his mould of thought was very different to ours, he was ever ready to respond to our requests for co-operation. When sending the review of Gandhiji's *Self-Restraint versus Self-Indulgence* (THE ARYAN PATH,

February), he wrote us: "I am not at all theosophical, and it is only by a kind of accident and almost a whim that I have contributed to 'The Aryan Path'." About this month's review he wrote: "I am ashamed to see how long it is that I have kept you waiting for the review on 'The Christian Renaissance'. Now that vacation has come I hope to get that through. As a matter of fact it is a book which has led me to a great deal of thought, and I am very grateful to you for having sent me such a book." At the very outset he offered free co-operation and expressed the hope that "the Editors will not

think me either rich or proud, but I do not wish to receive a fee for what I have done". In his last letter he said: "I think you might well put a note to say that Professor Knight of Trinity College, Toronto is endeavouring to found a new school of Shakesperian scholarship, showing a world of imaginative significance in Shakespeare which has not received due attention. His books such as 'Myth and Miracle' and 'The Shakesperian Tempest,' have received high praise from the critics." We are of course sorry to lose the co-operation of such an able and esteemed friend.

—EDS.]

Kettle Drums. By N. RAMABHADRAN, B. A. (Basel Mission Press, Mangalore. Re. 1).

The title of this book is a little misleading, for the strict definition of kettle drum is an instrument tuned to a definite note. It suggests the repetition of a sound that is apt to become wearisome. Mr. N. Ramabhadran's *Kettle Drums* is anything but monotonous. It is exceedingly varied, for it contains "Dhurdasa and Ramanuja" and "Krishna's Plan" in which moral precepts are lightly and humorously stressed, sketches of an old Indian Police Station and studies of such village worthies as schoolmaster, landlord, headman and accountant, recorded whimsically, sympathetically, and occasionally with gentle irony. There is an ambitious, but hardly successful, short story, "The Black Ointment," a letter or two, "Home Truths from the Epics," essays on chess and cruelty to animals, and finally two excellent sketches a little reminiscent of Mark Twain's *Innocents Abroad*. When we add apt quotations, generally from English classics, and a glossary, it will be realised that the author has not provided us with the nerve-racking tap, tap of a percussion instrument but rather with full orchestral effects that suggest wisdom, a kindly understanding of human nature, and not a

little laughter.

Mr. N. Ramabhadran is a modest man. "I do not claim," he writes, "any literary or artistic achievements." That is nearer the truth than Mr. R. S. Sarma's Foreword in which he expresses wonder that a member of the Indian Police Force should not renounce that "thankless service" and make "a little fortune in the literary world". The trouble is that Mr. N. Ramabhadran is not sufficiently critical. Every turn in his variety entertainment is not good. His "Cruelty to Animals" would be better if he had confined his subject to India. He spreads his net too wide and catches a very odd fish indeed: a Frenchman who "will eat anything from a rat to an elephant with gusto". Surely that is dealing with cruelty to human beings. If I cannot honestly say with Mr. N. Ramabhadran's servant, "Salaam—Swami," to all his literary efforts, I can warmly and gratefully praise his keen sense of humour and his pleasant observation of human character. There his touch is sure and delightful. Let him carve upon a cherry stone some closely observed Indian scene, let him laugh at himself, as he does so happily in "A Tramp in the Metropolis," and we may yet hear of a good Indian policeman becoming a still better writer.

HADLAND DAVIS

Caste and Democracy. By K. M. PANIKKAR. (Hogarth Press, London. 1s. 6d.)

This is a most useful and instructive little pamphlet. I use those much-hackneyed words advisedly, because they happen to provide the best description of it. *Caste and Democracy* is useful to those who are directly interested in Indian affairs, where "Hindu society is now facing a crisis unparalleled in Indian history," because it provides an epitome of the fundamental issues, stripped of the mass of detail which may be so misleading. And to those whose acquaintance with the crisis is little more than a vague knowledge that Mahatma Gandhi is leading a campaign against untouchability, the pamphlet is instructive without being dull.

Mr. Panikkar has divided his thesis into three parts. In the first he outlines the origins and principles of caste, laying stress—quite rightly—on its religious basis. He is, perhaps, rather too annoyed with the practice to admit the points in favour of the theory. That, in fact, it has been employed by selfish sacerdotalism to conserve exclusive benefits by the propagation of superstitious tabus merely emphasises the gap between theory and practice. It does not, in reality, invalidate the theory.

In the second part, the author sets forth the ideals and methods of demo-

cracy, showing how the idea of equality has permeated contemporary thought; and in the third, entitled "The Future of Caste in India," he makes, lucidly, his point that the criminal law of the Hindus, based on caste, has been totally displaced by the British system of penal law, based on egalitarian considerations. It is, primarily, this conflict in the sphere of everyday administration of justice, which has a very practical bearing on daily life, that has provoked the widespread revolt against the caste system.

If there is a criticism to be levelled against this admirably lucid essay, it is that the author gives insufficient weight to the *religious* basis of democracy. He tends to represent the clash as between Hindu faith (or "superstition," if you like) and Western political theory. But political theory, however reasonable, would have no chance against a religious faith, however unreasonable. The real motive power of the democratic ideal derives from the fundamental implications of Catholic Christianity. These issues are too wide to be entered into in a short review, but the universal struggle that they imply may be hinted at by suggesting that Calvinistic Protestantism conforms to the Hindu caste system by attributing unthinkable consequences to an accident of birth.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

Anthony Adverse. By HERVEY ALLEN (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d., and Farrar & Rinehart, New York. \$3.)

Once upon a time—in the days of the silent film—there occasionally appeared a much-heralded "super" production which claimed to present an historical epoch with absolute fidelity. An army of experts certified that every detail relating to buildings, costumes, manners, and customs was accurate. Hollywood's latest triumph was upon us. We rushed to get seats.

Then we sat in plush darkness and watched this mammoth production.

We gazed at scene after scene, thought it was very well done—and no doubt quite accurate—and agreed that Hollywood deserved a pat on the back. But—we only watched. Never, for an instant, were we compelled to identify ourselves with it imaginatively. The experiences it presented remained outside us.

Anthony Adverse is rather like that.

It is a romance of Napoleonic times. There are over 1200 closely-printed pages. It concerns a young man whose father was not his mother's husband and who, in consequence, is handed

over to a convent. Eventually he is adopted by his own grandfather (a remarkable coincidence!) and, later, is sent on business to Havana. Thence he goes to Africa, Paris, London, America, Mexico. And there's no saying where else he would not have gone if he had not killed himself by trying to cut down a tree with a stone in it.

There is no justification for the inordinate length of the book. Catalogues and inventories make for length, but not breadth—or depth. Consequently the monotony of *tempo* becomes almost unbearable. It is impossible not to skip. How we long for a stark unforgettable phrase, instead of one mountainous paragraph after another! A phrase which, by isolating a significant detail, makes a scene or a character flash into life.

As a façade, the book is an achievement. It is weakest in its characterisation and dialogue. Certain characters could be removed without substantial loss, and whole pages could be scrapped with positive benefit. These are the book's defects. Also, a vulgarity which on occasions jars badly. "The fountain giggled." ". . . . a twinkling

The Message of Krishna. By A. S. WADIA, M. A. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

This volume vindicates Hinduism against the erroneous interpretations and false charge of foreigners like Katherine Mayo and of Christian missionaries, like Whitehead. The author discusses some of the cardinal tenets of Hinduism and shows that they are in conformity with the most advanced philosophic and scientific thought of the West. For instance, the much misunderstood and misrepresented doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation, in his opinion, not only are the foundational beliefs of Hinduism and Buddhism but they also exist in undeveloped form in Christianity, Islam and Judaism. He cites many prominent ancient and

garter of mountains." And, referring to the builders of Burgos cathedral, "They had left the record of their ecstasy in a divine orgasm of stone."

In the front of his book Mr. Allen quotes these sentences from Sir Thomas Browne. "There is something in us that can be without us, and will be after us, though indeed it hath no history of what it was before us, and cannot tell how it entered into us." Mr. Allen, therefore, has challenged himself. And he has given his critics the right to seek a relation between his book and the quotation which is its text.

Only half a dozen novels could survive this ordeal, and *Anthony Adverse* is not among them. Nevertheless, here and there, are paragraphs and sentences which possess spiritual kinship with the quotation from Sir Thomas Browne.

What Mr. Allen lacks is a deep feeling for period. He gives us a façade, somewhat in the Hollywood manner. But this book is outstanding in contemporary fiction, and it does suggest that its author will probably write a much better one. But, if so, it will have a modern background.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

modern thinkers as upholders of this doctrine.

Mr. Wadia predicts a future for Hinduism even greater than her glorious past, and believes with Lion Feuchtwanger and Sir S. Radhakrishnan that the future of mankind will be under the influence of Asiatic and particularly of Indian culture. Just as the ancient culture of Greece and Rome awakened Europe to new life in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries so the ancient culture of Asia, of which Indian culture is the soul, will awaken the whole world to a new life.

We heartily commend the author for his sympathetic appreciation and proper exposition of Hinduism, which is so uncommon among non-Hindus.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Message of Asia. By PAUL COHEN-PORTHEIM, trans. by ALAN HARRIS. (Duckworth, London. 8s. 6d.)

India intuitively discovered the truths that European science is now about to place on a rational basis. The things which in a great many (though by no means all) cases were expressed symbolically by the Indians and were therefore dismissed as nonsense and superstition or at the most as "poetic fancy"—i. e., as scientifically worthless—by a superficial rationalism, are now being proclaimed once more by the most progressive European savants in modern scientific terminology.

That the present materialistic civilization of the West has proved a failure and is on the way to an utter collapse is now generally admitted. Many of the writers who have diagnosed the causes of this failure have rightly come to the conclusion that the salvation of Western nations lies in the adoption of the philosophy of life taught by the ancient Eastern sages. Mr. Cohen-Portheim belongs to this increasing group of writers, and thus his faith in Eastern philosophy does not arise from mere whim or fancy but is based on the latest scientific researches.

Our author points out that after a hard fight with ecclesiastical orthodoxy, science itself became intolerant, denying the existence of everything that reason could not explain:—

The supersensual, the metaphysical, the "miraculous" it has dismissed as an old wives' tale. . . . Philosophy had established the limited nature of our knowledge as far back as the eighteenth century, but what did natural science need to bother about that? It remained as infallible as any Pope. . . .

Science remained in this arrogant dogmatic position till about the 'eighties of the last century when, in our author's words, it "began to pay serious attention to psychic phenomena".

Spiritualism and occultism in its theosophical form—the foundation of the Theosophical Society by Madame Blavatsky falls within this period—directed general attention to transcendental problems once more, and Charcot and his school applied themselves to the study of hypnotism and magnetism.

Blow after blow was dealt to purely

materialistic science by the discoveries and researches of the scientists themselves. Of such discoveries a common feature, in Mr. Portheim's opinion, is "the recognition of a hitherto unknown psychic region which is definitely not identical with consciousness and not intelligible to reason alone" (p. 157) Again, Reichenbach's researches into "od" and the theories of animal magnetism, the discoveries of Röntgen and the Curies, the investigation of hitherto unknown rays and of radium, and the hypothesis of the all-pervading ether are mentioned in the book as helping to prove the falseness of the purely materialistic science. But more important than all these discoveries and their effects on the materialistic science is the moral which the author draws from them:—

What strikes me particularly about all of them is the way in which they agree with or approximate to ancient Indian ideas. . . . The upshot of them is that only a small fraction of the vibrations of light, sound and ether are perceptible to man; that is to say, his senses are absolutely untrustworthy. "Utterly deceived by the senses he walks through the world" and "Waking, sleeping, walking, the wise man remembers that the senses abide in the things of sense" is how the *Bhagavad Gita* puts it.

Our author is convinced that science is moving in the direction of ancient Eastern thought and will reveal to the initiated in India. He pays high homage to the esoteric philosophy of the East. Unfortunately his knowledge of true Yoga is imperfect; otherwise he would not recommend for spiritual unfoldment such practices as the fixing of the eyes on a shining object, crystal gazing, or gazing at a metal mirror, ink or water, or resorting to the action of a monotonous sound on the ear or a stupefying scent on the nostrils (pp. 190-191).

Himself an artist, our author's comments on Art are subtle and illuminating. His conclusions are worth noting:

Dancing, simple music without orchestral elaborations, classical architecture, architect-

ural sculpture and a formal, linear sort of painting—such is going to be the art of the immediate future. . . . Our age is looking for something more than a European harmony: the next classical period will be based on the spiritual equilibrium of Europe and Asia. It will be—after a preliminary period the length of which it is impossible to estimate—the first great age of world art.

Immensely interesting are the author's comments on the sex-question which is looming so large in our day. It is a real pleasure to find a Western writer expressing views which will be endorsed by every true occultist and which in our day have been so courageously advocated by Mr. Gandhi. Says Mr. Cohen-Portheim:—

A relatively small amount of libido is suf-

ficient for physical propagation; all the emotion that is left over when that purpose is served goes to the creation of spiritual and mental life, of true human progress.

It is doubtful whether any other Western writer has so cogently shown the necessity for "the diversion of the libido from sexual intercourse in order to make it available for higher purposes" (p. 167). The author's handling of this question is very sound.

On the whole this book is admirable, inculcates lofty teachings, and conveys a message of such inestimable value to the West, that in spite of certain defects, it is well worth reading and pondering over.

J. P. W.

Babylonian Nights' Entertainments: A Selection of Narratives from the Text of Certain Undiscovered Cuneiform Tablets. By JESSIE DOUGLAS KERRUISH. (Denis Archer, London. 7s. 6d.)

Nebuchadnezzar, that mighty king, could not sleep; and as insomnia can play havoc equally with a king as with a subject, something had to be done about it. In vain did the Physicians and the Astrologers hold council, the Seers and the Necromancers practise their arts; for still his woe afflicted that great Majesty. At last, the Chief Queen, "the wife of the King's blithe youth she was," conceived the plan that search should be made throughout all Babylon for "owners of stories able to bear away the hearer's thoughts from under the load of common life to the refreshing freedom of Other Lands, Other Times, and What Never Was". So, out of all countries from Egypt to India were story-tellers collected, and night after night did they vie with each other in weaving spells against the King's distress; and here in this book are some of them re-set by Miss Kerruish.

Twelve tales she has given us, and

much entertainment salted with a sly humour and served up with an Eastern leisureliness. Particularly to be recommended is "She Who was late for her Funeral," a story of the death and burial rites of Patesi Abargi, King of Ur; of those who went down with him to the Pit; and of why Ellatbau was not of them.

The stories in this collection may be trifles but they have in them spirit and life: they may be mere ghosts of "The Thousand and One Nights," yet somehow they have captured the atmosphere of the ancient East, as if a museum piece (rather a waggish one, if a museum piece can be waggish) were suddenly aroused from centuries of silence to talk to us. Evidently they were thought worthy of record, these pillows kneaded for a King's repose, these scatterings of poppy and mandragora; and Miss Kerruish is to be congratulated not only on her happy transcription of them, but also on the care obviously taken by her in making so judicious a selection from cuneiform tablets which have remained, and still remain—undiscovered by man.

A. R. UBSDELL

Science Hammers at the Church Door. By M. ELIZABETH MILLARD, M. A. (Rider & Co., London. 2s. 6d.)

This has now become a well-worn theme, and one wonders how many more writers are going to flog the dead horse of orthodox doctrinal Christianity. The merit of the book lies in the easy and lively manner in which the writer deals some hard blows to certain of the more glaring absurdities of the Christian position.

It is unfortunate that Miss Millard, while avoiding the Scylla of orthodox Christianity, should fall into the Charybdis of modern Spiritualism and Psychism; she expresses the view that the phenomena of séances have established survival after death. Sir James

Jeans has said: "Speaking as a scientist, I find the alleged proofs totally unconvincing; speaking as a human being, I find most of them ridiculous as well." This is the only conclusion to which an intelligent study of the subject should lead us. Fortunately the fact of soul-survival does not rest upon such slender evidence or lack of evidence as the séance room affords. If Miss Millard would wisely divert her attention to the study of *true* Spiritualism and Occultism as taught by ancient Eastern Sages and popularised in our day by Madame Blavatsky she would see why the phenomena of the séances should be shunned as morally and spiritually unclean, besides being insulting to human intelligence.

J. P. W.

Arya: The Call of the Future. By GRAHAM SETON HUTCHISON, D.S.O., M.C. (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London. 5s.)

The interest of this book on the problem of India's future lies neither in its political diagnosis, which is superficial, nor in the proposed solution, which, whatever its merits, sets at naught the premises on which it purports to rest. Its value lies rather in its sturdy defence of spiritual realities and the validity of the Aryan tradition. Col. Hutchison views India as historically the cultural centre of the world, and holds that not only have the various Indian philosophical systems a common origin in the Aryan ideology but even Christianity rests upon a Vedic foundation. He bravely states his conviction that

The Hindu philosophy is vested in the knowledge, not belief or speculation, that there have been men in the past who by direct experience of metaphysical truth have known the whole truth of man's nature and existence as well as that of the Universe as a whole. The men were the "perfected Seers," known as the Rishis, and from direct experiences the Rishis have taught metaphysical truth to the Hindus through the Vedas.

Col. Hutchison is right that no lasting solution of the Indian problem can rest solely on material considerations.

The ancient philosophies which under

Aryan rule dominated all material considerations are as valuable to-day in the governance of human organization and as expressing the happiness of mankind as they were in the epic age of the Aryan rulers.

Unfortunately his theory that the unrest in India is a revolt against an alien ideal and, specifically, against materialism, will not hold water. The Westernized young Indian is no whit less materialistic than his European contemporary. Let none read into Gandhi's political prestige the consecration of his followers to his spiritual ideals. If he withdrew from the scene to-morrow, all too quickly young India, in its present temper, would go the way of modern Japan.

In his carefully built-up premises, Col. Hutchison insists upon the divinity of man as the essence of the teaching of all the great Sages, "Thyself, the Inward Ruler, the Deathless". He enunciates the true aristocratic ideal of the guidance and leadership of men inspired by that faith. It is a far cry from that ideal to his proposed solution of the political problem of India—a monarchical federal system with rulers of new states appointed by the Paramount Power from among the "lesser Rulers and Leaders of Indian political thought".

PH. D.

The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. By SIR MOHAMMAD IQBAL. (Oxford University. 10s. 6d.)

In this book, Sir Mohammad Iqbal seeks to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge. He feels that the day is not far off when Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies.

The author deals first with the relation between knowledge and religious experience, pointing out that the Qur'an attaches equal importance to all regions of thought as yielding knowledge of the ultimate Reality, which reveals its symbols both within and without. He maintains that religious experience is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others except in the form of a judgment, which may be tested intellectually and practically. The intellectual test leads to the conclusion that the ultimate Reality is a rationally directed, creative Life, an organising Principle of Unity. Religion seeks a close contact with this Reality, a living experience and intimacy, which is achieved by the attitude of mind called Prayer, resulting in a spiritual illumination, for "all search for knowledge is essentially a form of Prayer". While in thought the mind observes and follows the working of Reality, in the act of prayer it rises above thought to capture Reality itself, in order to become a conscious participant in its life.

The author then considers the freedom and immortality of the human soul, and shews that the Qur'an emphasises the individuality and uniqueness of man, and makes it clear that he is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril; man therefore shares in the life and freedom of the Ultimate Ego. Destiny is not an unrelenting fact working from

without, but it is "the inward reach" of a thing, its realisable possibilities, which lie within the depths of its nature. This view of Destiny is one way in which the unitive experience expresses itself, that union which the mystics of Islam teach is not the finite effacing its own identity by absorption into the infinite, but rather the infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite.

Personal immortality, the author holds, is to be achieved by personal effort, and physical death leads to *Barzakh*, a state in which the soul catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality and in which it is prepared to adapt itself to these aspects. Life is, then, one and continuous.

Dealing with the history of Muslim culture, the writer claims that in the realms both of pure intellect and of mysticism (Sufism), the ideal revealed is the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite. This culture is based on the idea of the unity of human origin,—for all human life is spiritual in its origin—and on the concept of life as a continuous movement in time, for Islām, as a cultural movement, rejects the old static view of the universe and reaches a dynamic view. Humanity needs three things to-day—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Sir Mohammad Iqbal believes that it would be possible for Islām to reach a development that would meet these needs.

This is a closely reasoned book, full of arresting and suggestive lines of thought, and it will repay the most careful study on the part of all interested in the relation of the life of the spirit to the life of to-day. The book is well-produced and indexed, but includes a few misprints which need correction; "Mamonides" for "Maimonides" (p. 64), "Schopenhaure" for "Schopenhauer" (p. 77) and "Balvatsky" for "Blavatsky" (p. 8).

MARGARET SMITH

What Can We Believe? A Study of the New Protestantism. By JAMES GORDON GILKEY, M. A., D. D. (The Macmillan Company, New York.)

In the Foreword to his account of the New (Modernist) Protestantism, Dr. Gilkey distinguishes three main periods in the past history of Christianity: the primitive or apostolic period, which lasted about 150 years; the period of early Catholicism from the second to the beginning of the sixteenth century; and the period of early Protestantism from 1517 until the end of the nineteenth century. He might have added, however, that, in the third period, the later Catholicism of the Council of Trent and the Jesuits has played at least as large and characteristic a part as Protestantism. Christianity has now, Dr. Gilkey contends, entered on a fourth period in its evolution, namely, that of the New Protestantism; and the present group of liberal Protestant churches are the matrix within which this with its "new beliefs and new objectives" is taking shape.

The New Protestantism frankly rejects every form of authority as its basis. It is equally set against founding its beliefs on intuition; but seeks to build itself upon "logical inductions drawn from facts provided by reason and experience". Having defined his method of discovering religious truth, Dr. Gilkey proceeds to apply it, and very quickly proves to his own satisfaction the verity of theism with a number of corollaries thereof. He appears to think that his method is a new one; but as a matter of fact it is as old as human thought. In Christendom, for example, the Roman Catholic Church has long held it as a dogma that the existence of God and the truths of "natural religion" can be demonstrated by reason alone without the aid of revelation. By the same method non-Christian religions and philosophies reach quite different con-

clusions. A Buddhist would aver that "logical inductions drawn from the facts of reason and experience" went to show that there is no God in the theist sense; and a Materialist would on the same grounds deny the existence of God in any sense. The trouble is that the method is valid only if *all* the pertinent facts are taken into account; but nearly all men are apt to select as material for their logical inductions only such facts as appear to be consonant with their predilections; and it is a common-place that one can prove or disprove anything from selected facts.

The New Protestants were Christians before they began to select their facts and make their inductions. Their beliefs, at least in outline, were firmly established in advance of their search. In other words, they went looking, not for truth, but for satisfactory reasons for believing what they already regarded as truth. In doing this, they were in no way remarkable, for most men, who are enlightened enough to reject authority, do the same thing; and an entirely open-minded man is much rarer than the proverbial black swan.

To the crucial question: "What is man?", the New Protestantism gives us the old orthodox Christian reply. "Human personalities," writes Dr. Gilkey, "are independent entities, created by God and enjoying a literally endless existence"—a statement which would scarcely pass the test of his own canon of judgment.

But, though its theorising may be open to criticism, the practical aims of the New Protestantism, as outlined in Dr. Gilkey's final chapter, will have the sympathy of all liberal thinkers; for their stress is on the application to life of the ethical teaching of Jesus; and the ethics of Jesus are the ethics of all the great spiritual leaders of the race.

R. A. V. M.

The Kalyana-Kalpataru (Gorakhpur)

We have received the first issue of a new journal, *The Kalyana-Kalpataru*, which is described on the cover as "A monthly for the propagation of spiritual ideas and love of God". The object with which the journal is started must commend itself to all right-thinking men, provided the organisers take scrupulous care to see that no crude, wrong or superstitious notions about God find expression therein—such notions as a great Spiritual Teacher of India once condemned thus:—

It is belief in God and Gods that makes two-thirds of humanity the slaves of a handful of those who deceive them under the false pretence of saving them. Is not man ever ready to commit any kind of evil if told that his God or Gods demand the crime? voluntary victim of an illusionary God, the abject slave of his crafty ministers.

Happily the first number of *The Kalyana-Kalpataru* shows that wrong notions about such "an illusionary God" will have no place in its pages, and we trust subsequent issues will maintain this attitude.

This issue contains over sixty articles and necessarily they are of unequal merit. The distinguished Indian philosopher, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, writes on "The Hindu Idea of God" (reproduced from *The Heart of Hindustan*). He rightly points out that the great Indian Rishis of ancient times were "the pioneer spirits, the first researchers in the realm of spirit," and that

The truths announced by the Rishis are evolved not as the result of logical reasoning or systematic philosophy, but are the products of spiritual intuition, *drishti*, vision. The Rishis are not so much the authors of the truths registered in the Vedas as the seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of the universal spirit.

These great Rishis taught the true principles of Yoga whereby each individual can in this or some subsequent life on this earth attain the same high

spiritual level. In such a philosophy the absurd idea of a personal God as taught by orthodox Christian priests can have no place, and Sir S. Radhakrishnan in the course of his remarks on the words "personal God" as used in Hindu philosophy rightly reminds his readers that "Personality is a symbol, and, if we ignore its symbolic character, it shuts us out from the truth." Perhaps the whole teaching is stated more explicitly by H. P. Blavatsky:—

A man can have no god that is not bounded by his own human conceptions. The wider the sweep of his spiritual vision, the mightier will be his deity. But where can we find a better demonstration of Him than in man himself, in the spiritual and divine powers lying dormant in every human being? (*Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 567).

Pandit Bhawani Shankerji's contribution "Unity of Godhead" is a very learned disquisition in which he points out that the Hindu scriptures postulate only one Absolute Brahma or Mahesvara (Logos) called एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (one without a second), and that the Trinity—Brahma, Vishnu, Siva—are but different aspects of the one Brahman, are never separate from, or independent of, It. His exposition of the Hindu Trinity is most thought-provoking, and well worth an attentive study.

The article on "The God of Theosophy," concisely expounds the teachings of Madame Blavatsky, and points out that the Path of Realization, "to be consciously and cautiously walked," as described in *The Voice of the Silence* is in entire conformity with the teachings of the *Gita*.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, one of the greatest figures in modern India and a most devout Hindu, has an interesting article, "God and Sanatana Dharma," in which he expounds the high and lofty ideals which should govern the life of the true Hindu.

There are clear indications that many people will find *The Kalyana-Kalpataru* very helpful in their studies.

J. P. W.

A LETTER FROM LONDON

The general tendency of biological theory at the present day is in the direction indicated by Shaw in his Preface to "Back to Methuselah". There is, indeed, reasonably good evidence to support the argument that physical evolution did not proceed uniformly by slow and regular degrees, but that as a result of various causes of which we have no certain knowledge, there were periods during which evolution advanced very quickly and the emergence of a new species was accomplished within what must be counted from a geological point of view as very brief periods of time. Shaw further suggests, as an explanation of this contention, that the sudden quickening of the evolutionary process was due to an urgency that came from within, and manifested in the conscious desire felt by members of the species itself for change and development.

I have opened with this illustration because it may be used as some kind of touchstone to test social and religious conditions in Europe at the present day. Let us begin, however, by a brief consideration of historical precedents. In the past there have been the same comparatively rapid emergences among nations that have produced their own civilizations and with them their appropriate philosophies and religions. China, India, Egypt, Greece, to come down no further than the Christian era, each advanced very rapidly in the earlier stages of its develop-

ment. Some great inspiration came to the race, and within a century or two it began to evolve a high degree of intelligence and learning. And in each case, although with dissimilar effects, some climax was reached and thereafter the influence of the new civilization suffered a decline. Sometimes there was a barbarian influx that in destroying the dominant nation's temporal power, checked, also, its intellectual and spiritual growth. But in those instances, such as China, in which the civilization as such survived invasion, no advance was made beyond what might be described as the critical point. We see, in every case, that the great mass of the people were incapable of being raised to the level of its teachers.

Now there are indications that at the present time European civilization as a whole is nearing one of these critical points, and in this letter I propose to examine some of the symptoms that appear to me most representative of the prevailing condition. I will begin by taking the instance of my own country, confining myself in this connection to the witness of its religious movements.

Two such movements are most in evidence. One of them tends in the direction of breaking away from the old religious concepts; the other maintains its established premises but is seeking a restatement. The first finds expression

in a denial of general orthodoxy. There are innumerable societies and alliances, in which I might include the Unitarians, that have broken away from their allegiance to the rule of the Churches, Anglican, Roman Catholic or Non-conformist. For the most part such societies accept the figure of Jesus as an inspired Teacher and the perfect exemplar, but shoulder the burden of individual responsibility by denying the principle of vicarious sacrifice. For these, faith cannot be depended upon as a soul-saving resource at the eleventh hour.

The second movement can be typified by the remarkable activities of the "Oxford Group," generally known as Buchmanism. The principles of this group are not mainly fundamentalist, which is to say that they were not primarily reactionary. Their ideal is to bring religion, by which is intended the body of Christian teaching, into everyday life and to practise it openly. The most noticeable of their methods as a means to this object, is by the "sharing" of religious experience. The members seek as far as possible to "pool" their beliefs, emotions, and aspirations, thereby reinforcing their ideals and creating, within limits, a group consciousness. The tendency, so far as it can be foreseen, will be in the direction of mass suggestion, to which subject I shall return when I come to consider certain European symptoms.

Another aspect of the broad religious movement may be found in the increasing latitudinarianism of

the Established Church, even among its very highest dignitaries. This represents a marked inclination away from fundamentalism, but not in the direction of the dogma and ritual of the Anglo-Catholics. The principle of vicarious sacrifice remains, and belief in the Trinity, though it may be more loosely interpreted, but the Bible, as a whole, is regarded as a historical document and not as being literally inspired to the minutest details by the word of God. The general effect and object seems to be a reconciliation of Christianity with the teachings of modern science; and the movement is being slowly forced upon the Church by the attitude of the more thoughtful representatives of the young generation.

In Germany the situation is more critical. Dr. Karl Barth, the champion of the German Reformed Church, is in some particulars more nearly fundamentalist in his principles than Buchman, more academic and less imaginative. The vital issue, however, the independence of the Protestant Church in its relation to the State, is splitting the Church into two parties not upon doctrinal but upon political grounds. In this, Dr. Barth stands for religious independence. He demands that ministers of religion must put their "whole trust in the authority of God's Word," and says that while "it is no disgrace to be a Church politician . . . under no circumstances should we, as theologians, forsake our theological existence and exchange our rights as 'first-

born' for 'a mess of pottage'."* In other words he deprecates the regimentation of the Church for political aims.

This issue will inevitably have to be fought out in the near future, but already Adolf Hitler, following a Bolshevik precedent, is getting to work on the nation's youth. Such Evangelistic youth associations as "The Christian Pathfinders," "Girls' and Boys' Friendly Societies," "Bible Unions" and so on, are now prohibited from holding conventions and holiday camps. All of them are to be incorporated in the Hitler Jugend, and must obey the orders of their "group leaders". Finally, any boy or girl refusing to join the Jugend, will run the risk of being suspected as an enemy of the National ideals held by the Nazi Government.

This is the German form of that mass-suggestion which I indicated as being the informing principle of the Oxford Group in England. In Italy the same principle has not involved any antagonism to the Church. In Russia, it has ousted, or is ousting, the Church altogether. Should France go the same way, it seems probable that she will follow Russia's political rather than her religious ideals.

And that France will go the same way becomes every month more probable. I received a letter only two days ago from a personal friend, a professor in Toulouse University, and the author of

several books,† in which he writes:

Il se passe en ce moment en France de très curieux événements. Il y a un complet divorce d'opinion et de mentalité entre Paris et la Province. J'ai l'impression que nous nous acheminons insensiblement vers la fin du régime capitaliste et que les puissances d'argent font un effort désespéré pour empêcher la socialisation du pays; d'où les dernières émeutes à tendances fascistes, auxquelles ont répondu avec beaucoup de dignité les manifestations ouvrières.

Nevertheless, should some kind of revolution come about in France (all that is needed is a leader of sufficient force and personality), it is probable that no religious element will be involved. France is still mainly a Roman Catholic country, and in the south more particularly religion has a strong hold on the people. Moreover, as witness the instance of Italy, the Roman Catholic religion is one that lends itself to political leadership, since it is so easily divorcable from political practice. No other form of Christianity at the present day is so completely self-sufficient, so logically consistent, and, as a consequence, so incapable of growth.

Now what inferences, we may well ask, are to be drawn from the tendencies indicated by these examples? We see a general inclination on the part of the people to submit willingly to regimentation, to submit the individual will and power of choice to some leader who represents for them some common emotion or ideal. Fascism and Socialism are but two different

* *Theological Existence To-day* by Karl Barth. (Hodder & Stoughton)

† More particularly in this connection *L'Angleterre Nation Continentale* (Editions Tallandier), a study of recent social and political movements in England.

methods of encompassing the same object. Politically they are regarded as representing two extremes. Psychologically they present precisely the same phenomenon,—a direction of group-consciousness by mass-suggestion. And the precedents of history all go to prove that this condition either leads to decay or precedes a great change. When a nation such as the Inca civilization of Peru is left undisturbed to enjoy a system approximating to the ideals of state-socialism, it declines in vigour and originality. But this is not possible in a continent made up of such units as Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Great Britain, because these units have no common purpose. Nor is it conceivable that any one of these units, nor any majority combination of them, could impose their leadership upon the remainder.

It has been suggested that there are two forces which might become dominant in the future. These are Russia and Japan, mutually antagonistic, but both of them representing the vital urgency of a young people comparatively new to civilization. Both are, also, fundamentally irreligious. But it is obvious that no threat of the dominance of Europe by either Russia or Japan is imminent at the present time. And Russia, at least, must pass through a difficult stage of growth before she will be

capable of any form of leadership. At the present moment, her rulers are making the fatal mistake of deceiving Russian youth,—in order to elevate the ideals of Bolshevism,—by giving them false information with regard to the social and cultural conditions obtaining in Western Europe and America.* And since these fictions cannot be maintained indefinitely, some powerful reaction must inevitably follow the release of those bonds that at present are isolating the U.S.S.R. from the rest of Europe.

We have then come to a point at which we are confronted by a deadlock of antagonistic aims and ideals that holds no possibility of the emergence of any single directive purpose. And I believe that sooner or later this condition of unstable equilibrium must inevitably end in catastrophe. In the past it was possible to maintain some kind of varying balance by the instrument of segregation. Nations were divided one from another, and were able, within limits, to preserve their own identities. But modern applied science is steadily breaking down those artificial barriers; and already a movement towards a process of unification is beginning. It cannot, however, produce any valuable results unless it is informed by a true spiritual force, strong enough to overcome all the antagonisms of the peoples concerned.

J. D. BERESFORD

* See *Modern Russia* by Cicely Hamilton (Dent), a recently published work that gives a very interesting and unprejudiced account of Bolshevik conditions and methods in 1933.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

I must admit that Professor S. V. Venkateswara's theories leave me quite unconvinced. Even if we concede the autochthonous origin of the Vedic Aryans, my hypothesis stands. The discoveries of Sir Aurel Stein, Langdon and Frankfort show clearly the intimate connection of the Indus Valley culture with the great civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates delta. That the people of Mohenjo Daro were Semites is shown by the steatite portrait-statue of a priest, with his thick lips, high cheek-bones, full, fleshy nose and almond-shaped eyes. Anything more un-Aryan I cannot imagine. The Indus Valley seals contain neither the Cow or the Horse, both of which must have appeared, especially the Cow, if they were Aryans. The fall of Mohenjo Daro by the edge of the sword is clearly and unmistakably proved by the skeletons. The Vedas speak of the Dasyus, the enemies of their race, as "noseless" (*anāsāḥ*), and "phallus-worshippers" (*śiṣnadevataḥ*). The snub-noses of the statuettes may not be absolutely convincing, but what about the enormous stone phalli, found in such numbers? The syllogism is simple: the Indus valley people were phallus-worshippers. Phallus-worship is un-Aryan, and condemned in the Vedas as barbarous. Therefore, the Indus Valley people were not Aryans. Lastly, will Professor Venkateswara enlighten us on these three conundrums? (i) If Mohenjo Daro was not overthrown by the invading Aryans, by whom was it overthrown? (ii) If the walled cities (*purāḥ*) of the Dasyus, mentioned in the Vedas as having been overthrown, are not Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, where are they? Surely, if they existed, archaeologists would have traced them. (iii) Who were the Dasyus?

I believe that if Pargiter were alive still, he would have found, in the Indus Valley people, the clue for which he was looking. But this is another story, and too long a one to inflict upon you at this juncture.

London

H. G. RAWLINSON

TWO FRENCH VOLUMES.

According to some, the present crisis is a crisis of the Machine; for it has changed man from a merely eating and drinking and procreating animal into a more capable, more ambitious, more individual person. But when capacity becomes trickery, ambition becomes greed, and the individual instead of looking to the equitable satisfaction of his various needs, loses himself in the very means to that satisfaction; life is starved, and the being revolts and asserts itself in cynicism and perversion. Excitement becomes his need, and fatigue his repose. You have only to ask the ordinary man in the street from what he is suffering. From want of money, of course—of money that could allow him to have his cinemas, his rides, his wireless, his drinks or his dances. In fact, he suffers from being alone—being left to himself, to have nothing to escape to. If life has no hope, his escape is suicide. If not, there is the street, and that immense, sinuous solitude across the phantasmic chatter of man. Is there anything more dreadful than to be alone—among men?

"There are," says Duhamel in his last book, *L'Humaniste et L'Automate*, "two aspects of solitude. According to Socrates, solitude is the best of riches and the worst of misfortunes. Food of the healthy souls, solitude is the poison of the suffering ones. I have, during the two last years of the War, realised that the supreme peril of Mechanism is to kill sympathy,

* *L'Humaniste et L'Automate*—By Georges Duhamel.
Pour une Société des Esprits—By Paul Valéry.

and raise around human beings a wall of solitude."

That is significant of Duhamel. Nobody has fought against the onslaught of the machine, as he has done—so fervently and so humanly. Sensitive and generous, M. Duhamel cannot bear the idea that one day the machine will turn us into such indifferent automata, as to make us lose the very virtue of our being—human sympathy. He takes the example of medicine—for he has been a doctor, and he knows where it has led to. There is a patient: he has to be consecutively examined by the Radiologist, the Cystologist, the Chemist, the Occulist, the Oto-rhino-laryngologist, the Neurologist; and the Doctor, sitting in his consulting-room, looks at the results of the examinations before him, and dictates to the stenographer his diagnosis, without so much as looking at the patient. If it should be an operation, a number of very capable surgeons get together, and apply their learned minds in handling very delicate and infinitely varied instruments. That is very good, he says. It may be more precise, more perfect, more scientific, but medicine has lost that magic touch of the family doctor, that sympathy, comprehension and attentive, loving care. Of what use is all your knowledge if you have lost the very capacity to be human!

And the human is the eternal. We are living in a world, he says, where the sense of eternity is "in decadence". We have lost the capacity to feel beauty itself—beauty that reminds us of all that is great and unchangeable. Look at the lovely Dutch tulip, he asks us. It may be dead to-morrow. But it is beautiful. And once we have looked at it, we carry in us, something deep and permanent. "If we do not hope any more for the eternity of our soul," he adds, "we cannot at least renounce the feeling of the eternity of our work."

M. Duhamel, like most of his race, has not a metaphysical mind, and in his essay he very easily mixes up the eternal and the human—much to the

dismay of an Oriental. But one cannot help feeling that he is struggling to express how we are losing the intimate and continuing contact of our being with what is the most profound, and *eternal* in us. The danger of the machine is to kill this—or blind this—and make us react rather than respond, sense rather than feel, see rather than comprehend; in fine, make us intellectual machines.

This is the other danger of Europe—if not the sole danger. For let us not forget, the machine is the work of the intellect, and consciously or unconsciously shaped after it. And once the machine began to occupy a more familiar, indispensable place in our lives, our consciousness itself underwent a change, and our intellects became as gigantic, precise, insensitive and supreme. It created a new centre in us, dominating the other centres, of instinct and spontaneous response. All action had to be referred by the instinct and intuition to the intellect, which it sorted, weighed, calculated and judged, with an accuracy never before seen in man, and at the same time with results, never so incomplete, so chaotic, so grotesque. And yet drunk with its power, it became more imperious, more tyrannical, cold in its cruelty, and sadic in its satisfactions. But the body would not bear it,—revolted and became a bundle of nerves. Never before has man been less himself—and yet never so conscious of his existence. Standing on his own ruins, he knows not what deity to invoke.

M. Paul Valéry has chosen his deity—it is "L'Esprit". But in spite of his elegant and classical diction, and in spite of the legendary perfection of his intellectual machinery, he does not seem the less confusing. He often uses the word intelligence for "Spirit," and "Spirit" for brain. Nevertheless, this is how he defines it:—

"I mean by 'Spirit,' a *certain power of transformation* which intervenes, (more or less successfully) to solve, or to try to solve, all the problems which arise before man, and which his organ-

ic automatism does not or cannot deliver him from.... It is therefore natural," he continues, "in the presence of a generalised disorder, of insufficiency of known expedients, of the newness of the situation, which has nothing to compare with it in history, to seek that power of the spirit, more energetically, more rigorously and to postulate this: that if we had more 'spirit' and if we gave the 'spirit' more place and veritable power in the things of the world, this world would have more chances to recover, and more promptly. I am certain that the defect of intelligence and the restriction of its authority, are the most real and the most fearful vices of our condition. George Meredith, in a well-known poem, asked that a woman should have a little more of brain. 'More brain, O Lord,' he said... Let us pray, Europeans will obtain that. They have plunged into a prodigious adventure, which consists in modifying the initial, natural, conditions of life, no longer (as they did a few centuries ago) to satisfy certain definite needs and the limited necessities of the same life—but as though inspired to create a form of existence, completely artificial, a type of being whose means of understanding and action always increased, leading them deliberately, and systematically, to make all that they know and all they think, act on what they are . . .

"One cannot escape the impression of a *factitious fatality*, which leads humanity in the path of conflicts without issue; and without any other result than the destruction of all kinds that they lead to . . . It will then appear, by the way, that this letting loose of men implies a total and desperate renunciation of the 'spirit' . . . I come back thus to the beginning, which was an invocation to the intelligence of man—and I repeat: 'More brain, O Lord . . .'

One would feel like answering back, "More heart, O Lord, more heart . . ." For, apart from the machine, if the present disorder has one real cause it

is that man has had but too much of the brain—and little of that humanising and integrating co-operation of the heart. It is only this which can temper, soften and sublimate, and as it were lead back the brain-chips into the primal centre from which everything flows out as wisdom.

Soissons, France.

RAJA RAO

INDIAN MISREPRESENTATIONS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

May I say a word regarding the articles, "The Truth about the Gita," and "The Philosophy of the Upanishads" appearing in the February and March issues of THE ARYAN PATH? Dr. Sarma in his first article in January said that he would show later that the traditional Indian Orientation was absent from the works of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. Dasgupta on Indian Philosophy. In the two succeeding articles, however, what he has done is to give his own interpretation of the *Gita* and the Upanishads in the light of Absolute Monism and Pluralism.

To show that such orientation is lacking in an author's work, one has to show, by *taking the fundamental concepts* of the philosophy treated of, (1) that none of the three or four traditional interpretations (based on the different systems) are present in it; or (2) that though such interpretations are given, they are not properly appreciated in a spirit of sympathetic understanding, but are cantankerously criticised or caviled at; or, finally, (3) that, apart from literal adherence to the traditions, not even the *spirit* of Indian thought is to be found in them. Now Dr. Sarma is not able to show in his articles that Dr. Radhakrishnan is guilty of any one of these charges. All that Dr. Sarma has done (in the article on the *Gita*, for example) is to quote a few stray sentences and phrases here and there, taken out of their context, and exhibit them as inconsistencies, or (to a dualist) unpalatable statements, or as criticisms passed by the author against Sankara and others. If there

be inconsistencies, such are almost bound to occur in an extensive work like that of Dr. Radhakrishnan. Is it not, however, gross injustice to the author of *Indian Philosophy* to argue, as Dr. Sarma does, that because there are two or three inconsistent statements in that work, therefore the traditional orientation is entirely absent from it? Are we then to understand that a blind and unthinking exposition of an ancient author, shutting one's eyes to any defect or *lacunae* in him, is the mark of the presence of true Indian orientation?

In the article on "The Philosophy of the Upanishads" Dr. Sarma still pursues the same logic. Here his sense of Indian orientation first tells him—up to now unknown to us—that the Upanishads, *by themselves*, propound "a set theory of philosophy" or "a dogmatic scheme of theology": if this be so why should so many schools, differing from one another and yet all equally "hallowed by tradition," have sprung out of them? In the same para, however, (THE ARYAN PATH, March, p. 73), it is strongly suggested that the Upanishadic seers were distinctly aware of the contradiction between Adwaita and Vishishtadwaita. Were Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhwa then devoid of Indian orientation because they have all taken sides and equated the *Gita* and Upanishad teaching *either* with monism *or* with pluralism etc., ignoring the other possibilities? Dr. Dasgupta has been weighed in the balances (in about twenty lines) by Dr. Sarma and found wanting in Indian orientation because like Samkara and a host of illustrious names after him, he has declared the sum and substance of Upanishadic teaching to consist in the identification of *Atman* with *Brahman*.

The general impression that I have gathered is that "Indian orientation" is equivalent to an unhistorical, uncritical reproduction of everything that has been said in ancient works, without having any definite standpoint of one's own and, above all, without making any statements unpalatable to Dualists and

Pluralists.

Dr. Radhakrishnan and Dr. Dasgupta have told the western world of the existence not only of two forms of traditional interpretation of Indian thought, Monistic and Pluralistic, but of many others. This, however, need not preclude such philosophic expounders of the Upanishads from adopting either a critical historical attitude towards them or a definite interpretation.

Every Indian agrees, of course, that no true expounder of Indian philosophy should allow himself to be unduly influenced by western standards of judgment. But the point here is that no genuine attempt has been made by Dr. Sarma in his articles to show how the two historians of Indian philosophy of whom he writes have been so influenced.

Mysore

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

AN ANSWER TO DR. SCHRADER

"When a word, phrase, or symbol, having been once used for the purpose of suggesting an idea NEW to the mind or minds being operated on, is insisted upon irrespective of the said idea, it becomes a dead letter dogma and LOSES ITS VITALISING POWER, and serves rather AS AN OBSTRUCTION TO, than as a vehicle of the spirit." (Capitals mine)

I daily remember this teaching of H. P. Blavatsky when I see the most beautiful words, the most moving sentences, the most solemn promises, used as a screen to hide evil designs, to cover corruption, to mask hypocrisy. I naturally thought of this teaching when I read, in your January number, the letter of Dr. F. Otto Schrader on the Swastika.

Every student of Wisdom knows that in this dark age there are no pure races, that "castes have been mingled" in Germany as elsewhere, but caste exists always and forever in each man. It is individually that we must judge men in order to decide to which caste he belongs. But wisdom exhorts us not to judge unless it is for the purpose of helping. It follows,

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then, that the duty of a nation is to try to *raise* the level of its members and not to sacrifice a part of them, no matter on what pretext. It may be useful to add that one cannot claim to be an Aryan or of the noble caste, if one is not tolerant and is not working for Universal Brotherhood. This holds true for individuals as well as for nations.

Does Dr. Schrader know the words of a German whom the whole world honours, Goethe?

I do not hate the Jews. The aversion which I might have had for them in my youth was rather apprehension. Later, when I met among them many men of noble mind and refined feelings, my respect became mingled with admiration.

And how about the words of Chancellor Bismarck, a man of quite a different calibre to Hitler:

The Jews have many things which we lack: spontaneous feelings and actions which, without them, would not be so much a part of us. The Jews bring to the mixture of various Germanic peoples a certain "froth" that we must not underestimate.

Has Dr. Schrader tried to think impartially of the number of Jews who have helped to make Germany famous before the rest of the world?

The Hitlerites do not only hold a grudge against the Jews, but they persecute all those who dare to think differently without distinction of race or faith. How many true Germans, Catholics or Protestants, have had to flee from their country or now fill the concentration camps? Men of different colour are also banned by the Nazis. It is for all these victims, to whatsoever

religion they belong, be they white, yellow or black, that we cry out and protest.

Economic nationalism has led the world into an awful crisis, admirably described centuries ago in the eighteenth chapter of the Revelation of St. John:

The merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn . . . for no man buyeth their merchandise any more.

If spiritual democracy is rejected everywhere and if Nazism spreads like a spot of oil throughout the world, the rest of the prophecy will also come true, and the awful wars which will follow will rapidly destroy the modern Babylon and its so-called civilisation.

I am far from being an admirer of the Treaty of Versailles, nor did I have the slightest sympathy for the first treaty of that name which ended the War of 1870. I see that most of the governments called democratic are corrupt. I admit that some of the social reforms vaunted by the Fascists seem just and desirable. But what I consider disastrous is the reign of terror inaugurated by Hitler, the suppression of free thought, the smothering of souls, the hatred of race which he is striving to build up.

All this is vile. But that on top of it all, impudence should go as far as using the Swastika, the designation "Aryan," and the *Gita* to justify a policy diametrically opposed to every injunction of the Great Master—that is the last straw.

Paris.

SAM AÉLION

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"____ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Dickinson in his article on "What is Amiss with the League?" in the March *Contemporary Review* says:—

Men still talk of the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world; but we are in reality further away from that ideal than we were twenty years ago. We have assumed too rashly that when once a League of Nations was set up human nature would change of its own accord. It has not done so yet, and those who labour for a League that is truly international have still a long and heavy task before them.

Contemporary events and particularly the sordid history of the Disarmament Conferences go to show that there is considerable truth in this statement. The Great War and its bitter legacy united some of the Western nations temporarily and inspired them with lofty ideals, but, in a short while, all their new-born enthusiasm evaporated before the onrush of their old cravings for material gains and self-aggrandisement. How is this innate selfishness to be eradicated? This is another way of asking how is human nature to be changed?

There are signs that an increasing number of men and women look to the Eastern Wisdom for a satisfactory solution of the present-day problems and we venture to predict that in this direction alone will be found the safe way out of the existing chaos. The

Eastern Wisdom teaches that One Spirit animates the whole universe and all mankind. A recognition of this truth and of the Law of Karma leads to active conviction of Universal Brotherhood. When these great teachings are assimilated by individual men and women, a mighty social revolution will have been wrought, and the purpose for which the League of Nations has been established will be automatically achieved. Remedies not based on sound ethics and philosophy can only prove ineffective.

That interest in religion is fast reviving in England is the view expressed by Mr. R. Francis Foster in the New Year number (1934) of *To-day and To-morrow*. His reason is:—

Science nowadays has swung right round in its views and repudiates the idea of a materialistic universe... This generation may not be able to grasp with full intelligence what science is telling it, but it is filled with the spirit that has emancipated it completely from the despair of materialism.

Mr. Foster deals with some of the latest developments in science and emphasises what is now commonly admitted, that the discoveries of science itself have dealt a death-blow to the materialism of the nineteenth century. All this is perfectly true, but can it be logically

inferred then that religion is reviving?

That even thoughtful writers fail to grasp the significance of the present religious crisis in England and other Western countries is shown by Mr. Osbert Burdett, in an article in *The English Review*. This writer seems to think that since it was the materialistic science of the last century that dealt a blow to orthodox Christianity, now the turn has come for Christianity to reassert itself. After hurling anathemas against materialism Mr. Burdett goes on to say:—

Whenever a policy, a book, a scientific argument, a picture, a building, a piece of sculpture, a bill, a verdict, an article in a newspaper, or a sermon confesses, or implies, the fatal philosophy, its animating spirit should be exposed. The target is gigantic. It is, therefore, less for the Church than for its separate members to pot at it. The tactics of sharp-shooting, a horde of separate snipers are required. The hour has passed for Christianity to remain on the fence, or the defensive. Persecution might help. It must start a counter-attack, for only by taking up the challenge, from which it has shrunk too long and too timidly will it renew its inspiration, its belief in itself.

Mr. Burdett's fancy has outrun the limits of common sense; not only are the churches not in a position to "pot," but themselves offer a fine wide target for others to shoot at. Because a death-blow has been dealt to scientific materialism it certainly does not follow that moribund organized religion will revive. Will up-to-date science support the claims and doctrines

of the Church? Of course not. Can any philosophically trained mind which examines those claims and doctrines give them support? Of course not. If the Church wants to live it must die in its present form—give up its claim to be the only spokesman of Deity, revise its teachings about God, the Mother of God, the unique work of Jesus and such other tenets. It must take its place as one of the numerous creeds, some of which excel it in philosophy and are equal, if not superior, to it in ethics. No, the day of organized religions, not only Christianity, but all organized creeds, is done. Now men need a rational Religion which satisfies at once the keen mind and the aspiring heart of man.

But the difficulty in the way of a true Religion at once rational and inspiring does not lie entirely either in the materialism of science or in the dogmatism of an orthodox faith. Neither of these would be strong enough to stop the emergence of this new Religion. Its chief opponent in the twentieth century is a false religion which has already arisen and overpowered the mass-mind to a considerable degree. It is political nationalism.

Very aptly Mr. Aldous Huxley writes about it thus in *Time and Tide* (3rd March 1934):—

Most people desire certainties, feel the need of a faith. Modern education makes religious faith difficult, but has done nothing to undermine political faith. Masses of men and women think themselves too intelligent and well-informed to believe in miracles or the divinity of Jesus; but find not the